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1.  Introduction
The  debate over state ownership  continues  to rage. Despite  proclamations  of a new paradigm  following
the rise of Margaret  Thatcher  and later the fall of Communism  in Eastern  Europe  and the former  Soviet
Union,  arguments  over  public versus  private  ownership  persist. Disappointment  with the results of
insider  privatization  in Russia,  voucher  privatization  in the Czech  Republic  and infrastructure
privatization  in many  developing  countries  has spawned  new critiques  of privatization. Concerns  about
globalization  have also fostered  a backlash  against  privatization  in some quarters. A growing  empirical
literature  has begun  to provide  unambiguous  tests of the theoretical  arguments,  yet much  theory is
uninformed  by the empirical  results. The objective  of this article is to review  the ownership  literature,
organize  the main themes  of the argument,  and update  the reader  on the current  evidence.
State ownership  experienced  a period  of popularity  among  developed  nations  in the 1930's, 1940's and
1950's, and in developing  nations  throughout  the postwar  period. In industrialized  nations,  state
ownership  was viewed  as the remedy  for market  failures  such  as externalities  and monopoly,  which at
that time were considered  widespread.  In developing  nations  these  justifications  were coupled  with
arguments  that state-owned  enterprises  (SOEs)  facilitated  "economic  independence"  and planned
development. Theoretical  attacks on state ownership  date back  to the work  of Hayek and Friedman,  but
these  theories did not gain momentum  until the 1960's and 70's. At that time, an empirical  literature
emerged  to test the theoretical  prediction  made  by Alchian  (1965)  that SOEs  will be inherently  less
efficient  than private  firms. Studies  directly  applying  insights  from theories  of corporate  governance  and
government  behavior  to questions  of SOEs and privatization  began  to appear  in the late 1980s  and 1990s.
Meanwhile,  governments  in both industrialized  and developing  nations  expressed  concern  about  the SOE
record  of failure  and waste. These  concerns  brought  an increasing  urgency  to the debate on the merits  of4
state ownership. Are the failures  of SOEs  exaggerated:  do they in fact perform  worse  than private firms?
If the failures  exist, and reform  is necessary,  how should  it be accomplished? Can SOEs  be reformed
from within,  or are  they intrinsically  inefficient? Would  changes  in the operating  environment  improve
SOE  performance,  or is a wholesale  change  of ownership  necessary? Are SOE inefficiencies  a by-
product  of government-imposed  social objectives,  and do the benefits  from these social  goals outweigh
the cost of inefficiency? Are there inevitable  flaws in the process  of privatization  that will produce
performance  inferior  to continued  state ownership? Are  the circumstances  in some countries  so inimical
to successful  privatization  that state ownership  will always  dominate,  at least in monopoly  markets.
Three  broad approaches  to the SOE  debate  have  emerged. First, one set of theories  argues  that product-
market competition,  not property  rights, is the primary  determinant  of enterprise  performance.  A second
set of theories  focuses instead  on ownership  and hypothesizes  that states  use SOEs for purposes  other
than to maximize  social welfare,  in ways  they could  not if the firms were private,  and that this will have
an adverse  effect on performance  in any market  structure. A third approach  argues  that, regardless  of
government's  goals, private firms will be more successful  than SOEs  in addressing  problems  of corporate
governance. Our survey  examines  each of these  approaches  in turn, and considers  how  they interact
(sections  2-4). We then review  the argument  that, because  of flaws in the process,  privatized  firms will
perform  worse  than private  firms and worse  than SOEs  (section  5). We give a sense  of the empirical
findings  in each section  and also provide  an overview  of the results of empirical  work comparing  public
and private performance  (section  6). Section  7 summaries  the implications  of our findings.
2.  The Role of Competition
The extent to which competition  influences  performance  has important  implications  for reform. If the
introduction  of competition  is sufficient  to equalize  public  and private performance,  then  there is little
need to consider  the nature of ownership. However,  if competition  is not the only factor influencing  SOE5
operations,  then the focus  must be not solely  on the market  but also on the differences  between  public and
private  ownership. Thus,  we address  the question  of competition  before  examining  issues  such as
government  behavior  or corporate  governance.
Market Structure and Operational  Efficiency
Competition  in product  markets is widely  viewed  to improve  allocative  efficiency. In the presence  of
competing  producers,  prices  will tend towards  marginal  cost, thus allocating  resources  to their highest
value. Conversely,  when competition  is absent,  prices  are  raised and production  is lowered  relative  to the
competitive  equilibrium. There is theoretical  evidence  that this effect can be extended  to public firms -- a
small group of studies  (Beato and Mas-Colell  1984;  De Fraja  and Delbono 1986;  Cremer  et al 1987)
examines  the allocative  results  of public-private  competition  in a Stackelberg  duopoly  framework. These
studies  suggest  that the competitive  (price at marginal  cost) result  will obtain if the public firm is the
Stackelberg  follower. Moreover,  there is empirical  evidence  that in absence  of competition,  SOEs  will
produce  allocatively  inefficient  results  (Peltzman  1971;  Jones 1985). Although  allocative  efficiency  is
clearly  important,  SOE  behavior  in this regard  follows  the well-understood  patterns  of private  firms in
various market  structures  (barring  government-imposed  rules on SOE  pricing and output,  which will be
discussed  later). The following  discussion  will focus  on operational  efficiency,  defined  as the
maximization  of the present  value of outputs from a given  set of inputs. It is argued  that vigorous
competition  can enhance  such efficiency,  primarily  through  reducing  managerial  slack (X-inefficiency).
We will first examine  this operational-efficiency  effect in general,  and then determine  whether  it can be
applied to SOEs.
The theory  of competition's impact  on operational  efficiency  originated  with Hayek (1945)  and
Leibenstein  (1966), and falls into two related  categories:  incentive  effects  and information  effects.
Competition  in product  markets creates  incentive  effects  by threatening  the managers  of inefficient  firms
with diminished  market share. This process  is explored  by Machlup  (1967),  who argues that since6
managerial  slack can only persist in the presence  of supernormal  profits, it can only exist in imperfectly
competitive  situations. Incentive  effects  are further  developed  by Winter  (1971),  who models
competition  as a natural selection  process  that prods initially  inefficient  firms to become  efficient  or
disappear. Building  on these insights,  theories  of information  effects argue  that competition  provides
information  about  costs and manager  effort  to owners,  who would  otherwise  be in the dark.  With this
information,  owners  can design better incentive  systems  and evaluate  manager efforts  more accurately
(Holmstrom  1982;  Lin, Cai, and Li 1998;  Yarrow  1986). Hart (1983)  presents a much-cited  model in
which there is a common  component  of costs among  firms, and managers  whose  costs are lower than the
owners  estimate  can shirk and still meet their goals. However,  if competition  drives down  prices  and
costs in an industry,  owners  will know  that poor firm  performance  derives  not from costs (which  are
common)  but from managerial  slack. A similar  model  is presented  by Willig  (1985),  who shows  that
competition  can reveal information  about  managerial  effort  by increasing  the sensitivity  of profits  to
costs. In both cases, it is assumed  that armed  with better information,  owners  can devise incentive
structures  that align managers' interests  more closely  with their own. (The difficulties  surrounding  the
manager-owner  relationship  inform  our discussion  of public/private  ownership,  and will be explored  fully
in Part 4.)
While a strong  case can be made that competition  enhances  internal  efficiency,  when considering  SOEs it
must still be determined  whether  SOEs  will perform  as well as private  firms facing  the same  market
structure,  i.e. whether  the effects  of competition  are stronger  or weaker  than the effects  of ownership. In
their landmark  study,  Vickers and Yarrow  (1989)  -- henceforth  VY-- cite competition's  infornation effect
as an important  influence  on public-sector  performance,  but do not quantify  the effect relative  to
ownership. Two types of arguments  that emphasize  ownership  over competition  have been made: one
holds that political interference  in SOEs  overwhelms  competition  effects, while  the other  maintains  that
inherent  difficulties  in SOE  management  negate  the impact  of competition. These  two arguments7
surrounding  political  behavior  and SOE  management  are not necessarily  mutually  exclusive,  and will
both be addressed  in detail later in this paper.
Shleifer  and Visnhy  (1994) and Boycko,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1996)  address  the competition/ownership
question  by calling into  question  the motivation  of politicians. They  argue  that, even in fully competitive
environments,  SOEs will be inefficient  because  politicians  force  them  to pursue  political goals such as
over-employment.  Because  such distortionary  interventions  are more  costly and transparent  in private
firms, they maintain  that ownership  differences  are  the key source  of efficiency  differences. Nellis (1994)
supports  the view that politicians  will distort SOE  functions  to meet political  goals, and suggests  that the
conditions  for efficient  SOE operations  (competitive  markets and autonomous,  profit-maximizing
managers)  are precisely  the conditions  that politicians  wish to avoid. Stigliz  (1993)  raises similar
questions,  arguing  that because  of their desire  to use SOEs  for political  purposes,  politicians  cannot
credibly  commit  to encouraging  competition. These  arguments  are backed  up by research  documenting
political  use and abuse of SOEs  (Donahue  1989;  Kikeri,  Nellis,  and Shirley 1992;  and World  Bank 1995).
In this framework,  then, competition  would only be effective  when governments  are able to renounce
using SOEs  to meet political  objectives,  implicit  or explicit. Sappington  and Sidak (1999)  extend  this
analysis. In their view, because  SOEs  rarely seek  to maximize  profits,  they actually  have greater
incentives  and ability  to engage  in anti-competitive  behavior. In particular,  these authors  show  that SOEs
are more likely  than private  firms to set price  below marginal  cost, raising  their competitors'  costs
through market or political  methods,  and seek regulatory  barriers  to entry. This analysis  takes the
dominance  of ownership  over market structure  a step further:  instead  of a competitive  market improving
SOE performance,  an SOE  may in fact hamper  market  performance.  Once again,  this claim is supported
by empirical  evidence  (Jones 1985;  Kikeri,  Nellis, and Shirley  1992;  and World  Bank 1995).
Boardman  and Vining (1992)  look more  explicitly  at competition  and ownership  by examining  corporate
governance  problems. They consider  claims  (Borcherding  et al 19S2;  Whitehead  1988)  that in the case8
where markets  are fully competitive,  ownership  does  not have  an impact  on efficiency. These  claims
assume,  they argue,  that owners  monitor  managers  with equal effectiveness  in the public and private
sectors. Boardman  and Vining  challenge  this assumption  on several  levels,  maintaining  that average
private sector  monitoring  must be superior  due to the presence  of: owner-operated  private firms;  threats of
takeover;  failures  in the political  market;  government  monitors  with self-serving  interests;  and a market
for public managers  that is highly  distorted  relative  to the private market. They support  this assertion
with empirical  work  that demonstrates  superior  private  performance  in competitive  markets. Nellis
(1994)  highlights  similar advantages  for private  monitoring,  including  a more healthy  market for
managers  and profit-oriented  monitors.
The incentive  and information  effects  of competition  operate by strengthening  the owner's ability  to
monitor  the manager. But if the owner  cannot  (as Boardman  and Vining  argue)  or will not (as Shleifer  &
Vishny  and others maintain)  create  incentives  to accompany  that monitoring,  then these effects  of
competition  will not raise internal  efficiency. Thus,  the degree  to which market structure  influences
operating  efficiency  depends  on the relative  vulnerability  of public  and private firms  to political
interference  (discussed  in part 3) and the relative  success  of public and private firms in creating  effective
corporate  governance  (discussed  in part 4).
Kay and Thompson  (1986)  offer a rebuttal  to the argument  that ownership  matters more  than competition
for productive  efficiency. They  argue  that if competition  is must be combined  with a viable threat of exit
such as a hostile takeover  or bankruptcy,  it will promote  productive  efficiency. If there is no way to force
a productively  inefficient  firm out of business,  they argue,  the managers  will have little incentive  to raise
efficiency. Pointing  to the existence  of large  private monopolies  that are productively  inefficient,  they
argue that the importance  of exit cuts across  ownership  forms. Furthermore,  they cite empirical  evidence
that public and private performance  is similar  - both are good in competitive  markets and sluggish  in non-
competitive  markets. This empirical  literature,  however,  represents  early cross-sectional  studies  that9
focused  largely  on utilities  and in developed  nations,  which  has since  been supplemented  by an empirical
literature  that finds overwhelming  ownership  effects  (see section  6). Kay and Thompson  conclude  that
while  private ownership  has an edge in fully  competitive  markets,  focusing  on ownership  at the expense
of competition  produces  sub-optimal  results.  However,  if the threat of exit is as important  for
competition  to raise productive  efficiency  as these  authors  suggest,  then an emphasis  on introducing
credible  threats of bankruptcy  and takeover  would  produce  the best results. The  difficulties  of
introducing  a credible  exit threat in a public-ownership  environment  will be discussed  in Part 4.
Yarrow  (1986)  follows  an argument  similar  to Kay and Thompson  (1986),  acknowledging  that while
private firms have  a general  advantage  in the monitoring  of managers,  it is the competitive  and regulatory
environment  that shapes  the incentives  of managers.  This conclusion  is based on his survey  of pre-and
post-privatization  firm performance  in Britain,  which suggested  that performance  depended  more  on
market structure  than on ownership  (other  pre- and post-privatization  studies such  as Megginson  et al
1994  show ownership  and market  structure  to act more  as complements).  Yarrow therefore  also
concludes  that reforms  emphasizing  ownership  over market  structure  are misguided. These  findings  are
echoed  in Caves (1990),  who sees product-market  competition  as the source  of both allocative  and
productive  efficiency. Caves notes  that private firms  are better managed,  but stresses  that rigorous
competition  is necessary  to shape  the incentives  of these  managers. While  this may  be the case,  he does
not show that rigorous  competition  also shapes  the incentives  of public  managers. In the context  of
developing  nations,  Cook and Kirkpatrick  (1988)  argue  that because  of massive  market  failures,
privatization  will simply  produce  private  monopolies,  and that promotion  of competition  and continued
state  ownership  produce  the best results. This argument,  however,  assumes  that public  ownership  is the
best response  to market failure,  an assumption  that will be challenged  in the following  sections.
The  theoretical  arguments  giving  ownership  dominance  over market  structure  are strong. In the presence
of political  interference  and poor governance  in the public  sector,  it is probable  that SOEs will perform10
poorly even in highly competitive markets - or worse, that they will seek to cripple those markets.  Since
many objections to this argument are based on empirical observations, a review of the empirical literature
is revealing.  Those who place an emphasis on market structure argue that SOEs appear to have lower
performance because most studies only examine SOEs in non-competitive markets.  They predict that in
competitive markets, there would be little difference between public and private firms.  Those who
believe that ownership has a greater impact theorize that SOE performance would lag private performance
in both competitive and non-competitive industries.  Early studies produced contrasting results. 'Caves &
Christiansen (1980) found in a comparison of public and private railroads that in the presence of
competition there is no difference between public and private efficiency.  In contrast,  Davies (1971)
found a massive private-sector advantage in Australian airlines.  More recent studies, using larger
samples, broadly show that while both ownership and competition do affect performance, a public-private
gap exists even in competitive markets.  Boardman and Vining (1989, 1992) present data showing that
private firms are more efficient than SOEs, even in competitive industries.  Megginson, Nash, and
Randenborgh (1994), looking at firm performance before and after privatization, find that private
ownership increases efficiency in all situations, and that this effect is more pronounced in competitive
markets.  Ros (1999) finds that both ownership and market structure have significant effects on
efficiency, but that the ownership effect is slightly more robust across different measures of performance.
Our own survey of empirical results (see section 6) yields 16 studies of fully competitive markets,  11 of
which demonstrate superior private performance and 5 of which indicate no difference.  Evidence from
transition economies yields similar mixed results. Looking at privatized firms in Russia, Earle and Estrin
(1998) find that ownership has a much stronger impact on productivity than market structure. In a survey
of studies on transition economies, however, Djankov and Murrell (2000) find that import competition
has major positive effects outside of Russia. Focusing on Chinese SOEs, Li (1997) finds that productivity
gains are associated with market liberalization.  However, like Yarrow (1986), this study fails to consider
the proper counterfactual: although the performance of SOEs may have improved in the presence of
competition, the true question is whether this performance matches that of private (or privatized) firms.11
The empirical literature suggests that while market structure has a positive impact performance, this
impact fails to dominate the ownership effect.  The argument that market-structure dominance rests on
cases in which public and private firms in competitive environments perform equally well, and these
cases are rare.  Taken together with the theoretical literature, these empirical studies suggest that both
competition and ownership affect firm performance, and there are many ways in which the effects of
ownership can negate the influence of markets.
Natural Monopoly
There are, of course, some cases in which effective competition is neither possible nor desirable.  These
cases are usually natural monopolies, where indivisibility of networks or ever-increasing returns to scale
dictate that the most efficient market structure is a single firm (although Noll 1999 makes a strong case
that natural monopolies do not actually exist in their archetypal industry, telecommunications).  VY call
this the trade-off between allocative efficiency and scale economies.  They present a model showing that
in these cases, the duplication of fixed costs associated with firm entry outweighs the benefits enjoyed by
consumers.  This issue is especially relevant for SOE reform efforts, because a major rationale for state
ownership in developed nations has been the existence of natural monopolies that limit competition.
Market failure is even more of an issue in developing nations. Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) cite extensive
market failures in less-developed countries, and thus are highly critical of privatization efforts in these
countries. Their argument assumes, however, that the best remedy to market failure is state ownership.
In fact, where the market structure is taken as given, the focus of the literature shifts to whether state
ownership or regulation of a private monopoly produces better results.  Laffont and Tirole (1993) note,
citing Williamson (1985) and Grossman and Hart (1986), that the results of such a comparison depend on
whether contracts are complete or incomplete.  This is an important distinction that we will return to in
the section on government behavior.  If contracts are complete, if they define all aspects of performance
and every possible eventuality, then both regulation and public ownership face the same straightforward12
issues of enforcement.  Hence, both methods yield the same results.  Public ownership and regulation of
private firms will produce different results only in the presence of incomplete contracts, where some
aspects of performance and eventualities cannot be defined in advance.
In the real world of incomplete contracts, which path produces the best results?  The theoretical literature
finds that the answer often depends on the institutional environment. Shapiro and Willig (1990) use a
cost-of-information framework to analyze this question, and make a distinction between government
agents (SOE managers or regulators) who have a great deal of operational autonomy and those who have
little.  In the case of more autonomous agents, they find that public ownership and private ownership with
regulation produce the same results when information about profits is revealed only after investment, or
when the government is indifferent the amount of money spent to acquire that information ex ante.  When
these conditions do not apply, they find that the case for public ownership grows with the efficiency of
political markets and diminishes with the "salience" of the agent's private agenda (both issues that will be
addressed later).  When the government agent has little autonomy, regulation is preferred when
information on market failure is publicly known and information on profitability is revealed only after
investments are made.  While these results suggest that regulation is superior or at least equal to public
ownership in some situations, several problems with regulation have been noted. Adam, Cavendish, and
Mistry (1992) also present a model of the public ownership/private regulation choice.  The results of this
model depend on regulatory capacity, the importance of private information, and how much public
officials deviate from government objectives.  Analysis by Laffont and Tirole (199 la,  1993) suggests that
managers of regulated firms are caught in a crossfire between their two sets of principals, the owners and
the regulators.  Howeyer, they still conclude that the relative cost efficiency of regulated private firms and
public ownership is theoretically ambiguous.  VY identify four problems of regulation that can lead to
inefficiencies: overcapitalization (Averch-Johnson effect); asymmetric information; the complexities of
regulating multiproduct firms; and regulatory capture. All of these problems could also affect the
management of SOEs, however.13
One way to address regulatory failure is to foster competition through bidding for the right to operate as a
monopoly, a solution developed by Demsetz (1968).  Kay and Thompson (1986) and Bishop and Kay
(1989) support this solution to the natural monopoly problem, seeing it as a way to introduce a form of
competition into non-competitive markets.  Theoretically, this solution has the attractive property of
combining the efficiency gains from a single producer with (contracted) incentives to price and produce at
nearly competitive levels (VY).  Williamson (1976) and Goldberg (1976) find several problems with this
approach, however.  They raise the possibility that the bidding may not be competitive, either because of
collusion, asymmetric information, or incumbent advantages.  Further, these authors argue that the
incumbent and the winning bidder create a bi-lateral monopoly when pricing the assets that are to be
turned over.  Finally, since contracts are necessarily imperfect, there will be monitoring costs that may
exceed the benefits from auctioning.  Bishop and Kay (1989) respond by outlining criteria for contracting
out: if the enterprise in question is similar to activities already carried out by the private sector, and if
compliance with the contract can be easily monitored, then the Williamson/Goldberg difficulties can be
overcome.  As will be discussed later, Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) and Shleifer (1998) show that
contracting out can be particularly effective when consumers have a choice among contracted suppliers,
in effect negating the Williamson/Goldberg problems in the presence of competition.
A second method to reduce regulatory failure advocated in the literature is to use the regulatory
mechanism to promote competition among parallel firms (perhaps with separate geographic monopolies).
The regulated prices for one firm would depend on cost savings in other firms, thus producing a sort of
"race to the top" in terms of internal efficiency (VY).  Allocative efficiency would also be enhanced, as
the regulatory process would mimic the results of a competitive industry.  This method draws on insights
from the principal-agent literature, which holds that a principal (regulator) can achieve gains by
rewarding each agent (firm) on his efforts relative to all the other agents (Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983).
This method requires, however, that all the firms face similar circumstances or that differences can be14
measured  and accounted  for, and that they do not collude. These  conditions  may be difficult  to achieve
in practice.
Addressing the choice between  regulation  and privatization,  Shirley,  Nellis, and Kikeri  (1992)  and
Vickers and Yarrow  (1991)  acknowledge  the difficulty  of privatizing  natural monopolies,  but note that
the success  of such  privatizations  depends  on the regulatory  capacity  of the government. Thus, middle-
income countries  with more developed  regulatory  bodies  may be better able to privatize  and regulate  than
lower-income  countries  with weak regulation,  which suggests  that in all but the poorest countries,
privatization  and regulation  is preferred  to continued  public  ownership. However,  lower-income
countries  may be less able to manage  SOEs,  and thence  benefit more  from privatization  despite  poor
regulation. The empirical literature  is less ambiguous  than theory,  finding  that private  regulated  firms
perform  the same as or better than SOEs in most studies  (see section  6). But the advantage  of private
firms in natural  monopolies  is not as clear as in competitive  markets. Five out of 16 studies find that
monopoly  SOEs  outperformed  private monopolies.  Quality  of regulation  dominates  ownership  in some
circumstances,  for reasons  we examine  later.
Since  ownership  per se can affect performance,  the next section  investigates  whether  governments  are
likely  to demand  that their SOEs perform  efficiently. Section  4 asks whether  governments  which do
demand  efficiency  can overcome  the inherent  problems  of separation  of ownership  and control.
3.  Government  Behavior  and SOEs
Two different  sets of assumptions  can be used to analyze  the behavior  of governments.  One expects
political  markets  to work efficiently,  such  that rational  governments  have incentives  to maximize social
welfare. The other  assumes  that political  markets  are inefficient,  and that government  actors,  such as
bureaucrats  or legislators,  are able to maximize  their own utility  - in the form of votes, income,  or favors
- in ways  that subvert  the common  good. In this environment,  the concern  is that government  actors may15
promote  distortionary  and inefficient  SOE  practices  in order to reap political  benefits. In contrast,  there is
less latitude  for such a government  to intervene  in the operations  of private  firms.
Social-  Welfare  Maximizing Government
When  political  markets  are assumed  to work efficiently,  bureaucrats  and politicians  will act as loyal
agents  of the citizens. In this scenario,  competition  among  politicians  allows  voters to support  those who
most clearly  represent  their interests,  rejecting  those who do not.  This forces  politicians  to align  their
policies  with the interests  of the voters, or be left out of office. Thus, politicians  will seek to maximize
social  welfare,  or more specifically,  the sum of consumer  and producer  surplus  (VY). Much of the
rationale  for public ownership  is based on this framework.  When  there are significant  market  failures,  a
SOE manager  can produce  more  efficient  results  than managers  in the private  sector. In industrialized
nations,  the market failures  to be corrected  were typically  monopolies  and externalities  (Shleifer, 1998).
By abandoning  profit maximization  in favor of social  welfare  maximization,  an SOE  that is a monopoly
(natural or not) can adjust  prices  and output  to approximate  the competitive  equilibrium  (VY;  Shleifer  and
Vishny 1994). Likewise,  if industries  with major externalities  are dominated  by SOEs, public  managers
can adjust  prices  to reflect  the true social  cost of the product. As mentioned  before,  these solutions
usually require  the SOE  to be the sole producer  in the industry,  thus abandoning  any hope of competition.
In developing  nations,  the assumption  of a social-welfare  maximizing  govemment  has also been adopted,
although  for different  reasons. Developing  nations  tumed to public ownership  to accumulate  productive
assets  that were domestically-owned  and to promote  a broader  socialist  program,  as well as for the
reasons of extemality  and natural  monopoly  cited in industrialized  nations.
Other SOE goals intend  to promote  social  welfare  in ways  beyond  addressing  market failure. Some
scholars  (Turvey 1968;  Wintrobe 1985)  argue  that the benefits  of these social goals outweigh  the resulting
loss of efficiency. Choksi  (1979) provides  a long list of social benefits  that SOEs have  been intended  to16
provide,  including  facilitation  of industrialization  through  central  planning,  acceleration  of technology
transfer,  increased  employment,  reduced  inequality,  regional  development,  and increased  national  security
or "autonomy". Focusing  mainly  on developed  nations,  some see a role  for SOEs in addressing  market
failures  such as natural monopolies  (Millward  1983),  and in providing  an additional  avenue  for
macroeconomic  policy via price controls  (Millward  1976). Willner  (1996),  also considering  developed
nations,  argues  that public  ownership  reduces  income  inequality  and increases  product  quality,  at an
acceptable  loss of economic  efficiency. In the context  of developing  nations,  some  argue  that SOEs
contribute  to capital fornation, technology  transfer,  and income  redistribution  (Sacristan  1980;  Labra
1980),  although  these arguments  are often  made  within  a Marxist  framework  and thus suffer  from the
associated  theoretical  problems  of that ideology.
Despite  their conclusions  that social  benefits  can outweigh  economic  costs,  none of these articles  present
a framework  in which  these costs  and benefits  can be quantified.  Therefore,  comparisons  and judgements
about  the costs and benefits  of social  goals are inherently  arbitrary. Jones (1991)  confronts  this issue
more  directly  than other studies,  but still falls  short of a usable  method  of quantifying  costs and benefits.
With  the exception  of a few case studies,  the empirical  literature  has not seriously  tested  the argument  that
social  benefits  of SOEs outweigh  the economic  costs. Galal  et al (1994)  find that after privatization,
consumer  and labor  welfare  went up in 11 out of 12  cases in developing  and industrialized  countries,
despite  layoffs  and price increases. They  found  that the losses  of laid-off  workers  were compensated  by
severance  pay and outweighed  by the gains from stock shares  to those who kept  their  jobs. The loss to
consumers  from higher  prices  was considerably  smaller  than  the benefits  of expanded  and better service.
Moreover,  with the exception  of Millward  (1983),  the articles  supporting  the social  benefits  of SOEs  fail
to consider  other  ways of achieving  social  goals besides  public  ownership. The  large literature  on the
regulation  of private natural  monopolies  is largely  ignored,  as are alternative  methods  of addressing
income  inequality,  provision  of public  goods,  and macroeconomic  stabilization.17
Recent  studies on the rationale  for public  ownership  have  focused  on the ability  and desirability  of
government  intervention,  assuming  welfare-maximizing  government. Sappington  and Stiglitz  (1987)
argue  that public ownership  reduces  the cost of government  involvement  in markets,  and that this
involvement  is beneficial  when market  failures  must be corrected. They develop  these benefits  of
government  involvement  by introducing  their Fundamental  Privatization  Theorem. This theorem
identifies  the conditions  that are necessary  to make a transfer  from public  production  to private
production  efficiency-enhancing  - i.e. when  the market does  at least as well as a benevolent  goernment.
When  these conditions  hold, private  producers  have  the advantage. When  these conditions  fail, which the
authors claim  happens  almost constantly,  the benevolent  government  assumption  should  be relaxed  and
market and government  failures should  be carefully  compared.  Shapiro  and Willig  (1990)  find a similar
difference  in the cost of intervention,  and show that this difference  is due to the different  structures  of
information  in public and private sectors. Furthermore,  they find that such intervention  is desirable  when
the following  conditions  hold: there are significant  market  failures;  managers  have private information
about  costs and profitability;  and managers'  private agendas  are kept in check  by an efficient  political
market.
Controversy  surrounds  the idea that public ownership  is the best solution  to market failure, even  with a
welfare-maximizing  government. There  are two main challenges  to this view of public  ownership:  first
that market failure can be addressed  through  more  efficient  means,  and second  that even  benevolent
governments  have incentives  to skew  the distribution  of the maximized  social  welfare.
Hart, Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1997)  and Shleifer  (1998)  present  a useful  framework  for analyzing
ownership  decisions  in the presence  of welfare-maximizing  government. This framework  stands in stark
contrast  to that put forward  by Sappington  and Stiglitz  or Shapiro  and Willig, and it is both more intuitive
and more consistent  with established  theories  of contracting. In a benevolent-government  environment,
Hart et al and Shleifer  argue  that the decision  to produce  in the public or private  sector is analogous  to a18
firm's decision  to buy an input  on the market  or produce  it in-house,  an issue  first explored  by Coase
(1937). If a government  desires  a certain  good or service  to be provided,  it can produce  the good or
service itself  by contracting  with employees  and managers,  or it can contract  with a private firm  to
provide  the product. As with regulation,  in the presence  of complete  contracts  the problem becomes  one
of enforcement. There is no performance  difference  between  production  done in-house  and by a
contracted  firm. However,  in the real world of imperfect  contracts,  Grossman  and Hart (1986),  Hart and
Moore  (1990),  and Hart (1995),  show  that tradeoffs  emerge  between  public and private production.
Hart, Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1997)  argue  that the most important  of these  tradeoffs  is between  efficiency
and quality. They  present  a model  where quality  and cost are correlated. Even benevolent  public
managers  have  weak motivation  to invest in either  cost reduction  or quality improvement  because  they
would receive  little or none of the benefit. Private  contractors,  on the other hand, can pocket  the fruits of
cost savings. They thus have strong incentives  to reduce  costs but will only preserve  quality  where it is
contracted  for. Thus, excessive  cost-cutting  in the private sector  can lead to decreases  in non-contractible
quality  (privatized  prisons  are given  as an example). However,  Hart, Shleifer  and Vishny  (1997)  and
Shleifer  (1998)  note that even when non-contractible  quality is an important  part of output,  private
contractors  may still have an edge because  of forces  that compel  them to maintain  quality. These forces
include  consumer  choice among  suppliers  (competition),  and the effect of reputation  on future sales.
Overall,  Shleifer  (1998) concludes  that even in an environment  where government  seeks to maximize
social welfare  and contracts  are incomplete,  public  ownership  is preferred  to private contracting  only
when both of the following  are true: non-contractible  quality  and innovation  are important  and cost
cutting will lower  this quality, and consumer  choice and reputation  are ineffective. Historical  evidence
from the United States  presents mixed  evidence  on this theory. Troesken  (2000)  finds that public  water
utilities around  the turn of the century  provided  more  connections  to minority  neighborhoods  than did
private  water utilities,  resulting  in lower  minority  typhoid  rates in cities served by public firms. This
supports  the argument  that contracting  is not effective  when  competition  is limited and quality is19
important. However,  Troesken  (1999)  reports  that private water  utilities  around  the turn of the century
invested  in just as much  water purification  as public  waterworks  did, resulting  in fairly equal disease  rates
between  the two systems. This finding  suggests  that private  ownership  may be viable  even in the worst-
case scenario  presented  by Shleifer  (1998),  although  a crucial  question  is whether  investments  in
purification  can be considered  "contractible"  or not.
As was  noted earlier,  Williamson  (1976)  and Goldberg  (1976)  outline several  pitfalls  for contracting
schemes,  including  a breakdown  in competition  to information  asymmetries,  collusion,  or incumbent
advantages,  and the risk that the complexities  of transferring  assets  leads  to inefficient  ex-ante  investment.
However,  the implications  of these criticisms  are strongest  when there is also no product-market
competition,  as in the case of natural monopoly.  When consumers  have a choice  among  contractors,
Shleifer  and Vishny  (1997)  and Shleifer  (1998)  argue  that the socially  optimal  result  will obtain.
Empirical  analysis,  looking  at public  services  such as garbage  collection,  shows  that while  public
ownership  or an auctioned  monopoly  produce  sub-optimal  results, private  contractors  in competition  for
customers  yield high efficiency  (Savas 1977;  Edwards  and Stevens 1978). This evidence  suggests  that
the Williamson/Goldberg  objections  are true  for auctioned  monopolies,  and that the Hart/Shleifer/Vishny
framework  (rather  than the Sappington/Stiglitz  framework)  accurately  describes  more competitive
situations.
VY raise the second  challenge  to SOE  performance  in the environment  of what they call "publicly
interested"  government:  that governments  will skew  the distribution  of welfare. They  examine  the
assumption  that bureaucrats  and politicians  in this environment  seek to maximize  the sum of consumer
and producer  surplus. While this sum may in fact be maximized,  VY argue  that government  has
incentives  to place non-optimal  relative  weights  on these two surpluses. Governments  may place more
emphasis  on consumer  surplus  than on producer  surplus,  because  consumers  have  more voting  power
than producers,  or because  transfers  to low-income  consumers  are deemed  politically  desirable. In a20
similar vein, Schmidt (1996) raises a related point by showing that a benevolent government may over-
subsidize SOEs relative to private enterprises. If the government always chooses a level of production
that matches social cost and social benefit, the SOE manager will have no incentive to reduce costs, and
will therefore require greater subsidies. Privatization, Schmidt argues, is a way for the government to
credibly deny itself private information about production costs, and therefore force the new private
manager to reduce costs, since subsidies now reflect social benefits rather than firm costs.  This argument
that SOEs receive larger subsidies than private firms is backed up by empirical observations (Kornai
1980; Shirley and Nellis 1991; World Bank 1995; Claessens and Peters 1997; Djankov 1999).
Thus, even in the theoretical case where governments maximize social welfare, public ownership may not
always be the best solution to market failure.  In this situation, the choice between public and private
production depends on the ease with which contracts are monitored and enforced; the degree of potential
competition among private suppliers; the importance of non-contractible quality and innovation; and the
propensity of even enlightened governments to favor consumers (voters) over producers. Many more
questions about the merits of public ownership emerge when we relax the unrealistic assumption that
governments always act in the public interest. This case is explored in the next section.
Self-Interested  Government
As discussed above, many of the arguments for the supremacy of public ownership rest on the assumption
that politicians seek to maximize social welfare, which in turn depends on efficient political markets.
Theories of self-interested government undermine this framework by identifying serious imperfections in
political markets.  Most obviously, governments in non-democratic systems face little competition aside
from the occasional threat of a coup by another would-be dictator.  Moreover, it is argued that major
shortcomings exist in political markets even in democracies.  Boardman and Vining (1992) draw on
Mitchell (1989) and Buchanan (1969) to argue that while political markets tend towards the maximum
efficiency possible within a given set of institutions, there is great variation in political efficiency between21
those sets of institutions. A political  market can thus operate  well below the efficiency  attainable  with
ideal institutions. As will be explored  below,  a self-interested  government  operating  in inefficient
political markets  has more scope for intervention  in public  firms than in private firms.
VY provide  more  specific arguments  against  efficient  political  markets  by examining  the principal-agent
problem  between  voters and politicians. First,  they note  that this relationship  is characterized  by major
information  asymmetries,  when efficiency  demands  that voters  be well informed  about  the actiohs  taken
by politicians  and the consequences  of those actions. Second,  they argue  that elections  are poor
mechanisms  for producing  information  on voter's preferences,  as they are held infrequently  and are  not
constrained  to deal with any specific  issue. Third,  if the benefits  of a welfare-enhancing  policy are widely
dispersed  and the losses  concentrated,  all those who benefit  have the incentive  to free ride on any effort  to
support  the policy, while  the potential  losers  have  incentives  to defeat it. This is an example  of the classic
collective-action  problem  (Olson, 1965)  as applied  to voting. These  arguments  suggest  that the principals
(voters)  will have great difficulty  aligning  the interests  of the agents  (politicians)  with their own. The
similar difficulties  found between  politicians  and bureaucrats  or firm  managers  will be discussed  in the
section  on corporate  governance.
The most common  alternative  to the public-interest  framework  assumes  that politicians  and bureaucrats
behave like rational  actors  who maximize  their own utility,  in a world where voters have limited
information  and influence  on their decisions  (VY;  Vickers and Yarrow 1991). Analysis  in this framework
is often called  public choice. Applying  this framework  to the discussion  of market failure, Shepsle  and
Weingast  (1984)  argue  that due to imperfect  political  markets,  government  intervention  is not always  the
best response  to market failure. They  maintain  that a careful  comparison  of the relative  institutions
(market and government)  is necessary  to find the least-bad  solution.22
In a world of limited  information,  politicians  may use SOEs  to produce  political benefits  for themselves,
at the cost of inefficient  and distortionary  SOE  operations. Shapiro  and Willig  (1990)  explore  the impact
of imperfect  political markets  on the desirability  of public ownership. They  model a public manager's
utility as a mixed function  of social  welfare  and private  welfare,  where  private welfare  reflects either
personal  benefits  or the gap between  short-run  political  pressures  and long-run  public good. They argue
that the relative  weights placed on these  two kinds  of welfare  depends  on the efficiency  of the political
market  - the less efficient  the market,  the more  weight  managers  place on private welfare. This'
corresponds  with case studies and observations  of SOE  operations  (Jones 1985;  Kikeri,  Nellis, and
Shirley 1992;  and World  Bank 1995). Boycko,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1996) find that political
intervention  in public enterprises  is likely,  since  politicians  who manipulate  SOE  operations  for political
reasons  receive  all of the benefits  of such interventions,  but bear little of the direct (subsidies)  or indirect
(inefficiencies)  costs. Boycko  et al also argue  that it is more  transparent  and difficult  for politicians  to
overtly  subsidize  private firms than to slant  SOE  operations  so as to serve  their political  goals. This
argument  is backed up by Sappington  and Stiglitz  (1987) and Shapiro  and Willig  (1990),  who also hold
that state ownership  reduces  the cost of state intervention.  By defining  intervention  as the promotion  of
excess employment,  Boycko  et al find such interventions  to be distortionary  and inefficient. Jones (1985)
also focuses  on the use of SOEs  by politicians  to transfer  wealth and favors from one group to another.
He finds that these transfers  generally  run from low-income  groups  to well-connected  groups  in the
middle  or upper  class, and argues.  that this is usually  the result  of politicians' deliberate  efforts  to reward
their supporters. Like Boycko  et al, Jones  finds that political  transfers  through SOEs  are far less
transparent,  and therefore  far more attractive,  than traditional  taxes and subsidies. Stiglitz  (1993)  notes
the impact  these tendencies  have on SOEs  - by agreeing  to serve politician's interests,  SOEs  receive
subsidies  and are protected  from competition.
The literature  yields  two possible  frameworks  in which  political  pressures  affect SOE  operations. The
first assumes  that there is a hierarchy  of control  from voters to politicians  to firms, and that this hierarchy23
faces  principal/agent  problems  at multiple  levels. A second  theory abandons  the idea  of such a hierarchy,
treating  politicians,  firm managers,  and related  interest  groups  as essentially  equal actors  who bargain  and
swap favors.
Most arguments  based on principal-agent  problems  within  a hierarchy  draw  heavily from Alchian  (1965).
Alchian  argues that the key difference  between  public  and private  firms is the incentive  and ability  of
owners  to monitor  managers. In the case of private  firms,  ownership  is concentrated  relative  to ihe public
sector,  and ownership  shares  may be sold. As a result,  private  owners  have the incentive  to monitor  the
performance  of their managers,  and to align  the managers'  interests  with their own. In the case  of public
firms, ownership  is highly diffused  (indeed  all citizens  are owners),  and shares  of ownership  have no
value and may  not be sold. Thus,  owners  of public  firms not only have  little incentive  to monitor  their
managers,  but even if there were such an incentive  they would free-ride  on any monitoring  efforts. As a
result  of this disparity  in monitoring,  Alchian  argues,  public  firms will have lower internal  efficiency  than
private firms. Alchian's theory  thus describes  the principal-agent  problem  between  voters and politicians
(the other problem,  between  politicians  and firm  managers,  will be discussed  in section  4). Alchian's
argument  spurred  a furious  empirical  debate on the relative  efficiency  of public  and private ownership,
the results of which are summarized  at the end of this paper.
VY also address  the principal/agent  problem  between  voters and politicians,  as we have seen above.
Taking  a more specific  approach  than Alchian,  they begin  by defining  the goal of politicians  as election  to
office or advancement  to higher office. Politicians  in a party  have a common  interest in electoral  victory,
and will promote  or demote more  junior members  based  on their contribution  to that victory. Where
monitors  of public enterprises  are subject  to promotion  or demotion  on the basis of their efforts on behalf
of the party,  they will use all means  at their disposal,  including  SOEs,  to further  the electoral success  of
the party. VY note that if political markets  are efficient,  this motivation  does not necessarily  imply
inefficient  use of the SOE. Informed  voters will reward  a party  that increases  their welfare by running24
SOEs  efficiently. However,  principal/agent  problems  between  voters and politicians  prevent  the political
market from performing  efficiently. As described  previously,  voters  and politicians  have asymmetric
information,  elections  do not provide  information  on specific  issues,  and the diffuse benefits  of efficient
government  fosters free-riding  among  voters. VY show  that in the case  of SOEs,  these problems  can be
manifested  in the following  way.  Realizing  that in an election  with many  issues,  a vote  will not
necessarily  signal  a desire  for more  efficient  SOEs,  and that even if it did, free-riding  on the efforts of
other voters is likely,  the average  voter  will not invest in acquiring  information  about  the performance  of
an SOE  or the actions  of its monitor. While it is possible  that in imperfect  markets,  the maximization  of
electoral  prospects leads  to harmful  interference  in private  firms as well,  we have seen that such
interventions  are more  transparent  and more  difficult  (Jones 1985;  Sappington  and Stiglitz 1987; Shapiro
and Willig 1990;  Boycko,  Shleifer,  Vishny 1996).
An alternative  to the principal/agent  approach  to self-interested  governments  abandons  the idea of a chain
of command  in favor of a network  of managers  and politicians  who  strike bargains  to maximize  their own
benefits. This theory describes  three manifestations  of bargaining  behavior  - the petitioning  of politicians
by SOE  managers,  equal bargaining  between  the two, and the "capture"  of the political element  by
managers. These  manifestations  of public  choice behavior  vary by the relative  power  of these two
groups.
In the first case, politicians  and bureaucrats  are assumed  to act in their own interests,  and are assumed  to
place highest  value on income, power,  and prestige. All three can be enhanced  in the public sector  by
increases  in managers' budgets (costs),  whereas  in the private sector,  increased  profits are the source of
such  rewards. SOE  managers  are modeled  as constantly  petitioning  for ever-growing  budgets and
transfers,  and caring  about efficiency  only to the extent  to which there is competition  among  bureaus for
the provision  of government  services. These  insights  are based largely  on Niskanen's  theories of
bureaucracy  (1971  and 1975). They are supported  by empirical  work  (De Alessi 1969  and 1974;  Wagner25
and Weber 1975;  Orzechowski  1977;  Deacon 1979)  that identifies  artificially  high budgets  and staffing
levels  among government  bureaus. Alternative  formulations  of a manager's utility  function include
security  of tenure (DeAlessi 1974),  and the opportunity  to shirk  (Berle  and Means 1932;  Jensen  and
Meckling  1976;  Fama and Jensen 1983). Although  private  managers  may share these objectives,  it is
more difficult  and more  transparent  for them to meet these objectives  through  political  action than it is for
SOE  managers. And while politicians'  and bureaucrats'  demands  might be met by SOEs improving  their
profitability,  it requires  less managerial  effort  to petition  for transfers.
The second  form of public  choice behavior  grows  naturally  out of the insights of the first. If SOEs are
always asking  - competing,  most likely  - for higher  budgets,  while  politicians  can allocate  funds  to a
variety of purposes  besides  transfers  to SOEs,  then managers  must have something  to offer the politicians
in retum. Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994)  examine  such a situation,  comparing  the results of different
assumptions  about  the prevalence  of bribes. Their  basic  model  holds that SOE  managers  create
employment  that is politically  desirable  and economically  inefficient,  while  politicians  grant  managers
budget increases  in retum. Monetary  bribes,  if allowed,  alleviate  any mismatch  in this process  and may
pass in either direction. In the case  where bribes  are allowed,  they find that differences  in ownership  do
not translate into  differences  in the amount  of superfluous  employment,  as budgets and bribes will be
modified  to produce  the same result. In some  cases, SOE  managers  can "buy" additional  independence
by bribing  politicians,  which can lead to more efficient  staffing  levels. In this framework,  they find that
corporatization  generally  produces  more  efficient  results  than continued  state ownership,  regardless  of the
bribe regime. Boycko,  Shleifer,  Vishny  (1996)  extends  this analysis,  arguing  that such deals are more
likely under public  ownership  than private  ownership. Therefore,  they recommend  privatization  as the
best solution  to SOE  inefficiencies,  as it makes  political intervention  more difficult.
The third manifestation  of self-interested  behavior  occurs  where SOE  interest groups  have  more  clout
than suggested  by the passive budget-maximizer  or equal  bargainer  models  presented  above. In this case26
SOE  interests  "capture"  the government  body charged  with monitoring  (Borcherding,  Bush, and Spann
1977;  Borcherding  et al 1982). Focusing  on organized  groups  of public  employees  rather than SOE
managers,  they argue  that SOE  employees  trade votes for regulations  that both increase  the demand  for
their work and limit  the number  of those  who can compete  with them. This relationship  is different  from
the private-sector  capture scenario  (Stigler 1971;  Peltzman  1976;  Laffont  and Tirole 1991b)  in which
interest  groups  exert pressure  not through  votes but with bribes, campaign  contributions,  and ex-ante
employment  opportunities  to regulators. Previous  sections  have emphasized  how electoral  prospects
focus the attention  of politicians,  but the institution  of a secret  ballot makes  enforcement  of such contracts
difficult  (Borcherding  et al 1982). Pommerehne  and Frey  (1978)  and Courant,  Gramlich  and Rubinfeld
(1980)  demonstrate  empirical  support  for this criticism. Given  this inability  to enforce  contracts  that are
based on votes, SOEs might  rely on more  verifiable  methods  (bribes,  political donations,  etc.). Or,
instead  of SOE interests  capturing  their monitoring  body with their voting  power,  perhaps  a more  realistic
scenario  is for the monitoring  body  to award  favors  to the SOE  ex-ante,  thus giving  the SOE interests  an
incentive  to keep the incumbent  party in office  (Shleifer  and Vishny  1994).
There is empirical  evidence  that SOE  managers  and politicians  do in fact interact  in ways  that benefit
themselves  at the expense  of general  welfare. Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994)  catalogue  numerous  cases of
SOE  inefficiency  that result  from political  meddlings. These  inefficiencies  usually  take the form of
excess employment,  above-market  wages, investment  in projects  that benefit  politicians  rather than
consumers,  and allocative  distortions  resulting  from skewed  pricing  schemes. Frydman,  Gray, et al
(1998), focusing  on state ownership  in transition  economies,  find that "politicization"  prevents  SOEs
from restructuring. In particular,  they show  that political  pressures  prevent layoffs.  Similar  processes
are described  in Jones (1985),  Donahue  (1989),  Kikeri,  Nellis,  and Shirley  (1992)  and World  Bank
(1995).27
Drawing  on this literature,  with its emphasis  on the deals made  between  politicians  and SOE  managers,  it
is possible  to define  the conditions  under which  politicians  will use SOE  operations  to meet political
goals. First,  the degree  of such behavior  depends  on the degree  of imperfection  in the political markets.
The more  heavily distorted  the political  market,  the farther  a politician  can deviate  from social  welfare
maximization  (Shapiro  and Willig 1990;  Jones 1985;  VY). A related  condition  may be the independence
of the press  - politicians  may be more  able to distort  SOE  operations  the less the press  is likely or able to
detect  and publicize  such  distortions. A second  influence  on political  intervention  in SOEs  is the ease
with which budgets and regulations  can be arbitrarily  manipulated. An institutional  framework  in which
a politician  can easily increase  an SOEs subsidy  or hobble  its competition  will allow  more such activity
than a framework  where these decisions  are subject  to scrutiny  and can be blocked  by other political
players. A third factor influencing  the degree  of political  intervention  is the nature of the institutional
relationship  between  the government  and the enterprise. If an enterprise  is run as a department  of a
ministry,  with its managers  directly  appointed  by a minister  or chief  executive,  then political interventions
will be easy and common. Alternatively,  if the government  acts as the dominant  shareholder  of a largely
independent  firm, acting through  a board of directors,  political  intervention  may  be possible but is more
costly and more  transparent  (Galal 1991;  Shirley,  Nellis 1991). A fourth  determinate  of political
intervention  is the prevalence  of corruption. Since  bribes can facilitate  the deal-making  process  between
politician  and SOE  manager,  political  interventions  will be easier in an environment  where such activities
are commonplace  and unpunished  (although  Shleifer  and Vishny 1994  suggest  that bribes can sometimes
actually  reduce SOE inefficiencies).  Finally,  as is made clear by historical  evidence  on the timing of
reforms,  the degree  of political intervention  depends  on the opportunity  cost of SOE inefficiency  (World
Bank 1995). A country  that is, for example,  enriched  by a high-value  export  may find the costs of
inefficiency  to be acceptable. If the market  for that export  deteriorates  and the economy  suffers,  however,
politicians  may find that previously  sustainable  inefficiencies  are now  unaffordable. In such a situation,
SOE  reforms and even privatizations  are often undertaken.28
Judging  from  the literature  on government  behavior,  even  assuming  governments  act to maximize  social
welfare,  SOEs  are the superior  solution  to market failures  only in a relatively  rare  set of circumstances.
Moreover,  another  body  of analysis  strongly  suggests  that government  actors do not behave  in this way  -
rather,  they behave  as rational  players  who maximize  their own  welfare. SOEs  will thus be used  to serve
the purposes  of politicians  in most political  markets,  at the expense  of efficiency. Intervention  in private
firms will also occur,  but will be less effective  because  of higher  costs  and greater  transparency. If we
ignore  this body  of thought  and assume  that government  actors  put their interests  aside  and demand
efficient  results  from their SOEs,  another  issue  remains. Are governments  as capable  as private  owners  of
inducing  SOEs  to produce  efficient  results,  given  the problems  inherent  in the separation  of ownership
and control?
4.  Corporate  Governance
Public  and private firms face a similar  problem. In both cases,  owners  seldom  manage  the day-to-day
operations  of the firm. As a result,  they face  a principal/agent  problem  with those whom  they hire to do
the managing. Resolving  this principal/agent  dilemma  is crucial  to efficient  firm operation. Although
both public and private firms face  this problem,  their responses  and therefore  their performance  can differ
significantly. This section  examines  the problems  of separation  of ownership  and control  and some of the
ways  to address  these problems,  and then considers  the different  ways  that SOEs and private  firms
respond  to these problems  and solutions.
Separation of Ownership and Control
Most large,  modern  firms separate  the functions  of ownership  and control,  granting  the rights to the firm's
profits to the owners,  who hire  managers. This arrangement  has the desirable  property  of allowing
specialization  in management  and ownership  (Fama  and Jensen  1983;  Dyck 1999). Managers  can be
selected  for their comparative  advantage  in firm  operation,  and are subjected  to a market for their
services. However,  the separation  of ownership  and control  also has the undesirable  property  that29
decision-makers  bear few of the consequences  of their decisions. Since  managers' personal  objectives
are different  from those of owners,  a conflict  emerges  between  the two groups. Managers  have  every
incentive  to use their control  to serve  their own purposes  at the expense  of profitability  and owner
welfare,  or even  to expropriate  investments  funds  altogether  (Berle and Means, 1932;  Jensen and
Meckling  1976;  Fama and Jensen 1983;  VY;  Stiglitz 1993;  Shleifer  and Vishny 1995;  Lin, Cai, and Li
1998;  Kane 1999;  Dyck 1999; Shleifer,  Vishny,  La Porta, and Lopez-de-Silanes  1999a). Despite  these
agency  problems,  there is evidence  that separation  of ownership  and control  yields net benefits. Jensen
and Meckling  (1976)  conclude  that the benefits  of specialization  outweigh  agency  costs (monitoring  and
contracting). Fama and Jensen  (1983) identify  the circumstances  in which varying  degrees  of separation
are appropriate.  The extent to which  this principal-agent  problem  is resolved  has a major impact  on the
development  of capital  markets, dividend  practices,  and availability  of external  finance  (Shleifer,  Vishny,
La Porta, and Lopez-de-Silanes  1999a)  as well as on firm valuation  (Shleifer,  Vishny,  La Porta, and
Lopez-de-Silanes  1999b).
Problems  of separation  of ownership  and control  arise in both private firms and SOEs. Some argue  that
this fact alone eliminates  the differences  between  public  and private  ownership. For example,  Chang  and
Singh  (1997)  maintain  that SOEs  and large private  firms must both contend  with unwieldy  bureaucracies,
and that both of the respective  disciplinary  mechanisms  - political  and economic  markets  - are imperfect.
They  conclude  that private  firms therefore  have  no inherent  advantage  in corporate  governance. Vernon-
Wortzel  and Wortzel  (1989)  make a similar  argument,  maintaining  that the performance  of any
organization,  public or private,  depends  on management  culture and the clarity  of goals and objectives.
When  the objectives  are vague  and contradictory,  and the management  culture does not value efficiency,
then performance  will decay. They  claim  this explains  the patchwork  of success  and failure among  both
private and public firms. However,  these analyses  entirely  ignore  the mainstream  theoretical  framework
of corporate  governance  that is detailed  below. Moreover,  they present  no theoretical  model  or empirical
evidence  to show that public and private  management  problems  are the same. In particular,  Vernon-30
Wortzel  and Wortzel  fail to identify  why sub-optimal  "cultures"  develop  and persist in some settings  but
are replaced  by optimal  cultures in others -- essentially,  they  neglect  the corporate  governance
implications  of public ownership.
A more  widely  accepted  view is that there are important  differences  between  public  and private
governance,  and that these  differences  impact  performance.  Differences  between  public  and private
corporate  governance  can be examined  in the context  of the four major  methods  of governance:
monitoring  by owners,  formal legal  restraints,  takeovers,  and bankruptcy.
Monitoring
Monitoring  by owners  represents  the first solution  to the separation  of ownership  and control,  and may
lead owners  to write a contract  with managers  that makes  income  or continued  employment  dependent
upon firm performance.  Such  ex-ante  systems  are in fact widely  used,  although  their efficacy  has been
debated  in both empirical  and theoretical  studies  (see Shleifer  and Vishny  1995  for an excellent  overview
of this literature). One  problem  with monitoring  by owners  is that information  asymmetries  may allow
managers  significant  leeway  in negotiating  contracts  (Stiglitz  1975;  Hart 1983;  Willig 1985;  Yarrow
1986;  VY; Stiglitz 1993;  Kane 1999). Indeed,  the fact that managers  have more information  about
running  the firm  may be the reason  they were hired  by the non-expert  owners. As a result,  even if
contracts  are carefully  monitored  by owners,  managers  may still be able to deviate  significantly  from
profit maximization  by negotiating  so-called  "soft targets"  (Hart 1983). A more  serious  monitoring
problem  is introduced if ownership  is widely  dispersed. In such a situation,  each individual  owner will
have  an incentive  to free-ride  off the costly  monitoring  efforts  of other  owners,  and a sub-optimal  level of
monitoring  will result. This problem  is reviewed  in Furubotn  and Pejovich  (1972);  Yarrow  (1986);  VY;
Vickers  and Yarrow  (1991); Shleifer  and Vishny  (1995);  Dyck  (1999);  and Kane (1999).31
A possible solution to this collective-action problem is to concentrate ownership among a few large
shareholders, who are likely to have more incentive and ability to monitor managers (Shleifer and Vishny
1986, 1995; Dyck 1999; Stiglitz 1999).  Shleifer and Vishny (1995) review both the benefits and
drawbacks of this approach.  They present empirical evidence showing that large shareholding is
associated with more active corporate govemance (Shivdasani 1993; Kaplan and Minton 1994; Franks
and Mayer 1994; Kang and Shivdasani 1995). However, Shleifer and Vishny also note studies showing
that ownership concentration results in above-optimal risk concentration (Demsetz and Lehn 1985);
harms efficiency if owners with larger shareholdings pursue their own interests at the expense of smaller
shareholders (Stulz 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988; Dyck 1999); and produces suboptimal
monitoring when owners are themselves agents, as in the case of banks (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny
1990). Shleifer and Vishny (1995) conclude that concentrated ownership does not guarantee shareholder
monitoring of management contracts.
Since monitoring depends largely on the characteristics of the owners, it is not surprising that public and
private owners monitor in different ways. Alchain's (1965) seminal work on SOE govemance argues that
since all citizens can be considered SOE owners, an SOE's ownership is more widely distributed than a
private firm's ever could be.  Moreover, since there is no way for any single owner to sell (alienate) his or
her share of an SOE, public owners stand to gain or lose less from firm performance than do private
owners, who can sell their shares. Alchain argues that these two factors combine to produce sub-optimal
levels of monitoring in the public sector.  A related problem is that without a market for ownership,
information on firm performance is scarce and non-comparable.  This junction of information and
monitoring failures is noted by Vickers and Yarrow (1991) and Lin, Cai and Li (1998), who argue that
while both public and private systems of ownership suffer from collective-action problems in monitoring,
the ability of markets to generate information gives private ownership a crucial advantage in the
monitoring process.  Kane (1999) makes a similar argument, noting that monitoring is particularly weak
when ownership is diffuse and information is poor, and that both situations arise in public ownership.32
This suggests  that problems  of monitoring  in the public  sector  will be serious  relative  to admittedly
imperfect  private monitoring,  and result  in higher  management  discretion  and worse  public performance.
An alternative  approach  is to consider  government  to be the owner  of public  firms, rather  than all voters
(Yarrow  1986). Instead  of being  dispersed,  ownership  is highly  concentrated,  eliminating  the collective
action problem and leading  to more effective  monitoring. However,  if government  is a concentrated
owner it faces  the costs as well as the benefits  of concentration:  i.e., the government  will bear mnore  risk
than is optimal,  and is free to pursue  inefficient  goals without  the checking  influence  of smaller owners
(non-profit  goals, in the case  of SOEs). These  difficulties,  combined  with the problems  of opportunistic
behavior  discussed  earlier, suggest  that monitoring  of SOEs is no more effective  than in the private sector,
and can in fact be worse  (Vickers  and Yarrow  1991,  Boardman  and Vining 1992).
Contracts
The literature  suggests  formal legal protection  of owners  as a second  method  of controlling  managers.
While this approach  tries to solve agency  problems  through  a contract,  the contract  in this case broadly
describes  the exchange  of financing  from the owner/investors  for profit-maximizing  services  from the
manager,  rather than narrowly  specifying  management  punishments  and rewards.  Armed  with such a
contract,  owners  can turn to the court system if they believe  that managers  have violated  the contract  by
failing to maximize  owner  welfare. As Dyck (1999)  notes,  this contract-enforcement  process  requires
that high-quality  information  be available  to owners,  as it both serves  to alert them to managerial  slack
and provide  them with evidence  in court. However,  we have seen that information  asymmetries  between
owners  and managers  are significant,  and in fact are part of the motivation  for separating  these functions.
This suggests  that ex-post legal protections  may be imperfect  methods  of controlling  managers. Shleifer
and Vishny  (1995)  present  empirical studies  on the enforcement  of such contracts  in a variety of nations,
arguing  that the differences  in legal systems  between  nations  account  for much of the variation  in
corporate  governance  strategies.33
The characteristics of public ownership does not preclude the possibility of such a contract between the
SOE manager and government that can be enforced by the court system.  Several nations have attempted
to reform their SOEs with such performance contracts. However, empirical studies indicate that
performance contracts are likely to fail.  Looking at performance contracts in both industrialized and
developing nations, Nellis (1989) finds that the effectiveness of such agreements is low, and is often
reduced by unforeseen events, political pressures, and failure of governments to fulfil their obligations.
There is some evidence from China, however, that tying managerial rewards to firm performance
improves productivity, even under continued state ownership (Groves, Hong, McMillan, and Naughton
1994; Li 1997).  Groves et al (1995) also provide evidence that SOE managers can be subjected to a sort
of labor market where performance is rewarded and failure punished.
Takeover
If neither direct monitoring nor legal regulation of the owner-manager relationship bring about efficient
manager behavior, takeovers present a third possible tool of corporate governance. By buying most or all
of a firm's shares, an investor can temporarily produce a very high concentration of ownership, thus
bypassing the collective-action problem discussed above (Yarrow 1986; VY; Shleifer and Vishny 1995;
Dyck 1999). Jensen and Ruback (1983) provide an important early analysis of the impact of takeovers,
finding that shareholders of the acquiring firm as well as shareholders of the target-firm benefit, and that
these gains are driven by efficiency rather than market power. Studies by Coffee (1986), Jensen (1988),
and Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) further support the view that takeovers address the ownership/control
problem, and VY present a model showing that managers respond to threats of takeover with relatively
higher effort.
However, doubts remain about the efficacy of takeovers. First, the purported benefit of takeovers is to
concentrate ownership, which facilitates management change.  As we have seen, ownership concentration34
suffers  from problems  of its own. Indeed,  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1988)  address  the possibility  that, if
managers  in the bidding  firms are the ones making  decisions  about  acquisitions,  takeovers  may introduce
more opportunities  for management  discretion. A second  objection  claims that either  the bidder  will have
to buy shares  at prices  that reflect  higher  future  profits  (making  the takeover almost  prohibitively
expensive),  or all current  shareholders  will choose  to hold on to their shares,  in the anticipation  that they
will appreciate  if the takeover is successful  (Grossman  and Hart 1980). Shleifer  and Vishny  (1988)  and
VY counter  that this effect is exaggerated,  pointing  to the fact  that takeovers  do in fact occur,  although
they acknowledge  that the expense  of a takeover  implies  that only grossly  inefficient  firms  will be
targeted.
Because  shares  in public firms cannot  be sold,  there is no threat of takeovers  short  of full-scale
privatization  (Yarrow  1986,  VY). Public  managers  can rest assured  that inefficiency  and mounting  debts
are not likely to result in a drastic ownership  change  that would  cost them theirjob.  To the extent that
takeovers  pose effective  threats  to management  in the private sector,  this deficiency  puts public firms at a
disadvantage.  It could be argued  that full privatization  is a public-sector  analogue  to takeovers  (Wintrobe
1987,  Caves 1990). However,  there are several  problems  with this argument. First, while  poor
performance  in the private sector  makes  takeovers  highly  likely,  poor performance  in the public  sector  by
no means  guarantees  privatization. Second,  while  a credible  threat to privatize  may induce  higher
managerial  effort,  sooner  or later, the privatization  must go forward,  or credibility  will be lost and
shirking will  resume. Thus the performance  effects  of privatization  threats  do not support  ongoing  public
ownership.
Bankruptcy
Even if these three avenues  of corporate  control  fail to promote  efficient  management,  a firm in a
competitive  market cannot  continue  making  losses  forever. At some  point it must enter bankruptcy  -
indeed,  the very existence  of bankruptcy  implies  the imperfections  in the previously  mentioned  systems35
(Stiglitz 1999a). Although the details of the bankruptcy process vary by country, the essential elements
are  change in management, liquidation of assets, and restructuring of debt.  Because of the difficulty of
collecting debts in bankruptcy (Baird and Jackson 1985; Weiss 1990; Gertner and Scharfstein 1991;
White 1993; all cited in Shleifer and Vishny 1995), both equity and credit owners prefer that bankruptcy
function as an ex-ante threat to management, rather than an ex-post remediation.  Defining bankruptcy as
an excess of liabilities over assets, VY find that in an uncertain environment, the ex-ante threat of
bankruptcy is effective in boosting managers' performance and thus owner value.  There are cases,
however, when bankruptcy's usefulness as a tool of corporate governance is limited.  Shleifer and Vishny
(1995) warn that bankruptcy, with its reliance on efficient court systems and well-designed laws, is only
effective in developed nations.  Taking the transition in Eastern Europe as an example, Stiglitz (1999a)
goes on to warn that the expected results of bankruptcy - change of management, repayment of creditors
and equity holders - do not always obtain, especially when institutions protecting property rights are
weak.
If SOEs face a credible threat of bankruptcy, this might constitute a final check on managerial discretion,
but VY and Vickers and Yarrow (1991) suggest that there is no public-sector equivalent of bankruptcy.
They acknowledge (like Laffont and Tirole, 1991a and 1993; and Stiglitz 1993) that hard budget
constraints are not inherently impossible to implement for SOEs, and that budget constraints can
sometimes be softened for private firms.  These arguments suggest that the role of bankruptcy in the
control of public firms depends on specific policy choices by governments. There is evidence that these
policy choices often reflect political, rather than economic priorities.  Looking primarily at socialist
economies, Kornai (1980) and Komai and Weibull (1983) find that, because loss-making SOEs will be
subsidized (by the government or government-directed banks), the SOE managers have little incentive to
improve efficiency or avoid unprofitable investments. Stiglitz (1993) also argues that politicians fail to
credibly commit to ending subsidies to SOEs, given their incentives to use SOEs to pursue political goals.36
Sheshinski  and Lopez-Calva  (1999) present  a simple  model showing  that whenever  the political cost of
bankrupting  an SOE exceeds  the political  cost of subsidizing  it, politicians  will extend subsidies. Because
this reduces  the downside  risk of investments,  they argue  that in such an environment  SOE  managers  will
engage  in inefficient  investments. Dewatripont  and Maskin  (1995)  and Berglof  and Roland  (1998)
develop  more  rigorous  models  of this process,  highlighting  the role of sunk  costs in motivating  continued
subsidies. Schmidt  (1996)  argues  that even  under a welfare-maximizing  government,  subsidies  intended
to address  externalities  will actually  reduce  the cost-cutting  incentives  of SOE  managers,  thus requiring
yet larger  subsidies. Schmidt  presents  privatization  as a way for governments  to credibly  commit  to
reduced  subsidies. Empirical  evidence  suggests  that soft budget  constraints  are indeed  associated  with
poor SOE  performance  (Shirley  and Nellis 1991,  World  Bank 1995). Claessens  and Peters (1997)
document  this problem  in detail by looking  at Bulgaria,  where  bank financing  of large loss-making  SOEs
hindered  the restructuring  of those enterprises.  They  argue  that the continued  support  for these inefficient
SOEs  de-capitalized  the banking  system  and upset  the fiscal  balance  (through  unpaid  taxes). Djankov
(1999) describes  a similar  process  in Romania,  where  a reform  regimen  for failing SOEs did not harden
budget constraints  and therefore  did not promote  restructuring.
The literature  just reviewed  suggests  that competition  cannot  substitute  for private  ownership;  that
politicians  in inefficient  political  markets  may  distort SOE  operations  for their own interests;  and that
even if they don't, the task of motivating  managers  is even  more daunting  in the public sector  than in the
private sector. Based  on these analyses,  the case for public  ownership  is limited  to a small set of cases
(see Hart, Shleifer,  and Vishny 1997  for a discussion  of where to draw  the line between  public  and private
provision  of public goods). These  insights  are useful for policymakers  currently  faced with the choice
between  public and private ownership. However,  what advice  can be given  when SOEs  already exist? In
the next section,  we examine  the case of reform  through  privatization,  and identify  the cases in which
privatized  firms may not act like private  firms.37
5.  State Ownership and Privatization
The literature surveyed above suggests that in most cases private ownership is more effective than public
ownership.  It is a further question whether aprivatized firm, a firm which has been moved from public to
private ownership, will perform in the same way as firms that have always been private.  If there are
significant differences between private and privatized firms, then privatized ownership may not produce
better performance than public ownership.  Most opponents of privatization base their arguments on this
problem.  The private/privatized distinction is seen as particularly relevant in developing nations and in
situations where governments are self-interested. In this section we examine the situations when
privatized firms fail to behave like private firms.  We also consider whether privatized firms should be
expected to behave like private firms, or whether the goal of privatization should be to simply improve
performance relative to state ownership.  Finally, we examine the argument that changes in government
objectives, signaled by a willingness to privatize, may complicate the analysis of government ownership.
The factors that prevent privatized firms from behaving like private firms can be separated into two
general categories.  First, the state of a country's markets and institutions can play a major role in
privatization outcomes.  Second, the political motivations of policymakers can cause them to design sub-
optimal privatization plans.  The affect of both factors on post-privatization performance is examined in
the following sections.
Institutional  and Market  Factors
The effect of a country's  institutions and market structures on privatization has inspired a large literature
(see Havrylyshyn and McGettigan 1999 for a review focusing on transition economies; Shirley, Kikeri,38
and Nellis 1992  for a discussion  of developing  nations). A major focus  of this literature  has been  the
impact  of market structure  on privatization  outcomes. In industrialized  nations,  the most common
market-structure  concern  is that privatization  of natural monopolies  will produce  inefficient  results (VY).
Options  for handling  natural monopolies  in developed  nations  were reviewed  in section 2. Recall  that
these options included  privatization  and regulation  through auctioned  contracts,  parallel  geographic
monopolies,  and regulatory  plans that reward  relative  performance  among  contractors. In general,  it has
been found  that privatization  and regulation  of natural  monopolies  presents a viable alternative  fo state
ownership. In developing  nations  and transition  economies,  there is concern  that monopolies  are likely to
exist because  of pervasive  market failure,  lack of information,  and high entry costs. Cook and
Kirkpatrick  (1988) maintain  that developing  nations  are marked  by pervasive  natural monopoly
conditions. Thus,  they argue  that privatization  is likely  to simply  replace a public monopoly  with a
private  one. Adam,  Cavendish,  and Mistry  (1992),  surveying  privatizations  in seven  developing
countries,  characterize  the industries  into which  the SOEs  were privatized  as highly  concentrated.
Commander  and Killick (1988)  and Jackson  and Palmer  (1988)  make similar arguments,  claiming  that
increasing  returns and therefore  natural  monopolies  are common  in developing  nations.
It is true that if a privatized  SOE  is able to establish  or maintain  a monopoly,  allocative  and productive
efficiency  will suffer  relative  to the competitive-market  outcome. Nevertheless,  recalling  that
competition  effects fail to dominate  ownership  (see section  2), it is entirely  possible  that a private  firm in
an imperfect  market may perform  better  than a SOE. The  record  of privatizations  in the developing  world
supports  this possibility,  and weakens  the arguments  of this group  of authors. Several  major empirical
studies have  found marked improvements  in post-privatization  performance  in developing  nations
(Megginson,  Nash, Randenborgh  1994;  Galal,  Jones,  Tandon,  Vogelsang  1994;  Ramamurti  1997;  La
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes  1997). Frydman  et al (1997)  and (1998),  Claessens,  Djankov,  Pohl (1997),
and Pohl et al (1997)  find similar  results in transition  economies. In the sample  of the empirical  literature
reviewed  in this paper,  out of 10 studies  that look at post-privatization  performance  in developing  nations,39
eight report performance  gains  while two find no change. If natural  monopoly  were truly pervasive  in
developing  and transition  economies,  the empirical  results would  show weaker  post-privatization
performance.
Underdevelopment  of capital markets,  bankruptcy  procedures,  and court systems  are also cited as
institutional  obstacles  to effective  privatization.  Specifically,  the weakness  of these institutions,
particularly  in transition  or developing  nations,  is seen as reducing  the effectiveness  of private cbrporate
governance.  Cook and Kirkpatrick  (1988)  and (1997)  argue  that weak capital  markets and costly
information  in developing  nations  preclude  takeovers. Additionally,  they maintain  that underdeveloped
capital  markets also soften budget  constraints  in developing  nations. Looking  at transition  economies,
Stiglitz  (1999a) identifies  corrupt  and underdeveloped  court  systems  as a major impediment  to efficient
bankruptcy  institutions.  Also looking  at transition  economies,  Nellis (1999)  notes that banks,  often still
run by the state, failed to adequately  harden  the budget  constraints  faced  by privatized  firms. When
combined  with cumbersome  and uncertain  bankruptcy  procedures,  he concludes  that bankruptcy  did not
provide  an adequate  check on management.  Brada  (1996)  is skeptical  of the view that banks in transition
economies,  as the primary  conduits  of credit, can serve  as de-facto  owners.  This study  also blames
ineffective  bankruptcy  institutions  for this failure. Stiglitz  (1999a)  also finds that state-run  or recently
privatized  banks in transition  economies  failed  to harden  budget  constraints. Taken  together,  these
studies suggest  that in developing  and transition  economies,  institutional  problems  can weaken  corporate
governance  by preventing  takeovers  and softening  budget  constraints. If these problems  are serious,  a
case can be made (and Cook and Kirkpatrick  1988  and 1997  do) that privatization  will result  in sub-
optimal  performance.
The critical question  is not whether  corporate  governance  is weak  compared  to standards  in developed
countries,  but whether  state ownership  produces  better results. The empirical  literature  cited above
suggests  that these institutional  weaknesses  do not prevent  privatized  firms from boosting  their40
performance relative to SOEs.  Performance gains in privately operated water systems in Argentina
(Alcazar, Abdala, Shirley 2000), Cote d'Ivoire (Menard and Clarke 2000), and even Guinea (Clarke,
Menard, Zuluaga 2000), for example, suggest that underdeveloped markets, poor information, and weak
and poorly enforced bankruptcy and takeover laws do not necessarily mean that a privatized monopoly
will under-perform SOEs.  Further evidence indicates that bankruptcy is not universally hopeless in
transition.  Schmidt and Schnitzer (1993) provide theoretical evidence that the threat of bankruptcy has an
impact on the managers of newly privatized firms.  Dittus (1994) offers evidence that banks have, on the
whole, allocated credit efficiently in transition economies, and Capek (1995) finds that newly-formed
banks are more able to break free of old lending institutions and achieve more efficient allocations of
credit.  Commander, Dutz, and Stern (1999) report that with the admittedly large exception of the former
Soviet Union, Romania, and Bulgaria, most transition economies have introduced hard budget
constraints.
Political Goals and Privatization
The motivations for government policy are of utmost importance in shaping the performance of a
privatized firm.  Most governments cite enterprise efficiency, private sector development, and budgetary
relief as the official objectives of privatization.  Other objectives can, however, creep into a privatization
program and distort the operations of the privatized firms.  These additional objectives are no surprise in
the framework of a rational, self-interested government, but they are also possible in models where
governments are assumed to maximize social welfare.
As noted by VY and Caves (1990), govemments often seek to maximize the revenues from a SOE sale.
One way to achieve this is to limit ex-post competition, thus raising the value of the firm's future income
stream. Another distortion noted by these authors arises when governments distribute ownership shares
as widely as possible for reasons of equity, diluting ownership among many small owners, with41
detrimental effects on monitoring.  Revenue maximization and an "equitable" distribution of shares can
be consistent with maximizing social welfare.  However, the effect of these goals is to undermine the
overall efficiency of the economy.  If the newly privatized firm is protected from competition, then the
gains in allocative and productive efficiency will be lower than privatization into a competitive market.
Britain's privatization experience in the 1980's produced this combination of privatization with curbs on
competition.  VY find that in the telecommunications, natural gas, and electricity industries, government
policy deliberately limited the degree of entry and competition, to the benefit of incumbents and the
detriment of consumers and overall efficiency.  Foreman-Peck and Manning (1988) examine accusations
of poor quality and low productivity at British Telecom, and find that the ideal strategy would have been
to split up the incumbent in a manner similar to AT&T's breakup.  Based on the outcome of privatization
in Britain, Caves ( 1  990) is particularly critical of privatization plans that neglect competition-enhancing
measures.  He argues that while state ownership is inefficient, private ownership is also inefficient unless
there is vigorous competition.  Caves sees monopoly, natural and otherwise, as widespread and is
therefore skeptical of privatization in general.  Kay and Thompson (1986), and Yarrow (1986) also
examine the British privatization experience, and reach similar conclusions.  These authors are highly
critical of  privatization without competition, arguing that the gains from privatization are lost if a public
monopoly is simply replaced with a private monopoly.
While the neglect of competition opportunities is important from a policy perspective, the critical
question is not whether the performance of privatized firms is optimal, but whether it is better than under
state ownership. Large-sample empirical studies suggest that even in imperfect markets and even in
LDCs, privatized firms can exhibit performance gains (Megginson, Nash, Randenborgh 1994; Dewenter
and Malatesta 1999; Frydman et al 1998; D'Souza and Megginson 1999a and 1999b). Out of the post-
privatization  studies articles surveyed in section 6, 12 examined firms in industries with limited or
varying levels of competition.  Seven of these studies showed improved performance, while five showed42
little change.  Two of these five had sample sizes of only one, however, and should be treated with
caution.
If governments are seen as self-interested, the scope for distortionary privatization policies is wider.  First,
bowing to pressure from interest groups, governments may choose non-optimal methods of privatization
that include selling a SOE to the incumbent managers or employees. Ownership by these groups presents
a number of difficulties.  Although manager ownership completely eliminates the ownership-coritrol gap,
the possibilities for capital infusion are limited (Estrin et. al. 1995) and the impact on performance is
theoretically ambiguous (Frydman et. al. 1997). The empirical literature, focusing mainly on voucher
privatizations in Russia and the Czech Republic, is critical of worker ownership.  Most studies maintain
that firms owned by workers are unlikely to engage in necessary restructuring; worker-owners will
maximize non-profit objectives such as wages, job security, and reduced hours.  These difficulties are
discussed by Earle et. al. (1995); Frydman, Gray et. al. (1998); Barberis et al (1996) Havarylyshyn and
McGettigan (1999); Kane (1999); Dyck (1999); Claessens and Djankov (1999); and Nellis (1999).
While such insider privatization does complicate the problem of governance, most transition governments
(notably Hungary, Poland, and Estonia) have successfully avoided this form of privatization -- in fact, the
countries of the former Soviet Union and the Czech Republic are the only examples of major insider
privatization.  In their extensive review of the literature on transition economies, Djankov and Murrell
(2000) find that privatization is strongly associated with enterprise restructuring, except in the former
Soviet Union.  It would be wrong to conclude, therefore, that political pressures make this form of
privatization impossible to avoid.
A second avenue through which government objectives can distort privatization is suggested by Boycko,
Shleifer and Vishny (1996b).  They reject the usual model of government as a homogenous actor and
argue that governments, particularly in transition economies, are often uneasy coalitions of reformers and43
traditionalists. In such divided  governments,  ministers  are likely  to pursue  their own agendas,  which can
include  blocking  reforms  if the constituencies  of those ministers  benefit  from the status quo. While  the
reformers  in a government  may be able to push  through  a general  privatization  program,  the anti-reform
ministers  successfully  prevent  pre-privatization  restructuring  (such as layoffs,  investment,  or breakup  of
monopolies). These  authors maintain  that the lack of restructuring  before  Russia's privatization  can
largely  be traced to that country's badly  divided  government.
An additional  way for self-interested  govemments  to take advantage  of privatization  is selling  the
enterprise  at a heavy  discount  to a favored  supporter  in exchange  for a bribe or political  favors.  Owners
chosen for their political clout may have  incentives  to distort  SOE  operations  in ways that benefit  their
political  patrons, for example,  by employing  redundant  workers  or distorting  prices. The government
may be more susceptible  to demands  for subsidies  and protection  from those favored  owners  than from
private owners  in general. In such an environment,  marked  by soft budget  constraints,  limited
competition,  weak corporate  govemance,  and continued  emphasis  on non-profit  objectives,  it is likely that
the performance  of privatized  firms will be sub-optimal.  More importantly,  it is possible  that in such
circumstances  their performance  will not exceed  that of SOEs. From  a theoretical  standpoint,  however,  it
is not clear that these  abuses would  be significantly  worse  than  those that can occur  under state
ownership. Refer  to section  3 of this paper,  and Jones  (1985),  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994), Shirley,
Kikeri,  and Nellis (1992),  and Boycko,  Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1996a)  for a review  of politically-motivated
abuse of SOEs.
Hart, Shleifer,  and Vishny  (1997) make a distinction  between  corrupt  politicians  who seek bribes and
corrupt  politicians  who  use patronage  to reward  political  supporters. If patronage  is more  of a problem
than bribe-taking,  they argue  that privatization  is desirable  because  it reduces  opportunities  for patronage,
while  for this same reason  politicians  will privatize  less than is optimal. On the other  hand, if bribe-
taking is more  likely than patronage,  they argue  that privatization  may be risky because  the process  itself44
may be corrupted,  while for this reason  politicians  will privatize  more than is optimal. Shleifer  (1998)
extends  this analysis  by noting  that if the costs of ongoing  corruption  in SOEs  outweigh  the potential
costs from a corrupt  privatization,  then privatization  is still the best policy. This paper also claims that it
may  be easier to rid a privatization  process  of corruption  than to reform  endemic  corruption  throughout
government. Frydman,  Gray et al (1998)  provide  empirical  evidence  that political interference  hinders
enterprise  restructuring,  although  not necessarily  in a corruption-driven  framework.
The balance  of the empirical  evidence,  however,  indicates  that despite  the hazards  of such corrupt
privatizations,  the performance  of privatized  firms is superior  to that of SOEs. Studies including  data
from developing  and transition  nations  (Megginson,  Nash,  Randenborgh  1994;  La Porta,  Lopez-de-
Silanes  1997;  D'Souza, Megginson  1999a;  Frydman  et al 1997  and 1998;  Pohl et al 1997)  show  that firms
improve  their performance  when  privatized. Moreover,  in the sample  of studies  reviewed  in section  6, the
studies finding  equal  performance  between  SOEs  and privatized  firms tended  to focus on developed
nations,  where corruption  has less explanatory  value  than elsewhere.
Altered  Government Objectives?
Much of the rationale  for privatization  is based on the observation  that governments  distort SOE
operations  to meet political  goals. Furthermore,  the literature  examining  the interactions  of political goals
and privatization  assumes  that governments  that operate  SOEs inefficiently  also run the risk of privatizing
inefficiently. Both of these  positions,  however,  ignore  the argument  that the mere existence  of a
privatization  agenda implies  that the government's  goals  have changed  fundamentally. The objectives  of
a government  can change  for a number  of reasons:  an exogenous  economic  shock  that raises the
opportunity  cost of inefficiency,  or a change in the makeup  of the government,  through democratic  or
non-democratic  transition  (World  Bank 1995). Instead  of maximizing  its own rents and power,  the
government  places a priority  on efficiency. It can be argued  that governments  that engage in privatization
are not the ones  that only seek rents and power,  and vice versa. Such a position  has two implications:45
governments that privatize, by their very nature, may be less tempted to distort the process for their own
interests; and governments that privatize may be better suited to efficiently managing SOEs.  If these
arguments are true, then an obstacle to privatization (political interference in the process) is weakened
while a rationale for privatization (political interference in SOEs) is also undermined. No study known to
the authors has examined this issue directly, although Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), Shleifer (1998),
and Keefer (1998) explore the implications of corruption and institutions for contracting out.
Despite the generally positive results of privatization, there are enough examples of privatization gone
wrong to undermine the argument that privatizing governments are less likely to pursue political goals in
the process.  The privatization experience in Russia, in particular, suggests that governments that are
willing to privatize are still capable of engaging in self-interested behavior (Stiglitz 1999a and 1999b;
Shleifer 1997).
Alternatives to Privatization?
Up to this point, we have argued that privatization is generally the best way to reform SOEs and reduce
the distortions they create.  However, the literature has come to focus on privatization as the primary
method of reform only in the last decade (World Bank 1995; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Shleifer 1998;
Nellis 1999). Before this shift in emphasis, alternative reform methods were given equal or greater
weight (Shirley 1983; Bishop, Kay 1986; Galal 1991; Shirley, Nellis 1991). While the argument for
privatization has some theoretical basis and is strongly supported by the empirical evidence, many
continue to support alternatives to privatization.  The failed privatizations in some transition countries
(the former Soviet Union and the Czech Republic), coupled with the apparent success of gradual SOE
reform in China, has added strength to the case for privatization alternatives.
McMillan and Naughton (1992) review the progress made by SOEs in China, making two important
observations.  First, they argue that entry of new private firms is crucial to the overall transformation of46
the economy. These new firms both reduce the scope of SOEs relative to the whole economy, and
provide competition for the SOEs.  This competition, the authors argue, has more of an impact on SOE
efficiency than ownership.  Second, they argue that non-privatization reforms can boost SOE
performance.  Liberalization provides SOEs with market signals, enhanced autonomy gives managers the
ability to improve efficiency, anid  the retention of profits gives them the incentive to do so.  This argument
is backed by Groves et al (1994), who find that creating performance incentives for managers leads to
increased worker productivity.  McMillan and Naughton (1992) conclude that China's  strategy of gradual
reform, which liberalizes markets, encourages new entry, and reforms SOEs with new autonomy and
incentive structures, provides better results than the privatization-centered reforms in Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union.  Stiglitz (1  999a and 1999b) draws attention to the relative growth performance
of China and the former Soviet Union, and draws similar conclusions.
McMillan and Naughton (1992) make a valuable point about the importance of new entry in transition
economies.  The conditions that promote entry, and the effects of entry on allocative and productive
efficiency, have been largely overlooked by the transition literature. However, the McMillan/
Naughton/Stiglitz conclusion on the superiority of gradual, non privatization reforms has been challenged
at several levels.  Sachs and Woo (1994) argue that the economies of China and Eastern Europe/former
Soviet Union present fundamentally different challenges, negating any comparison.  They maintain that,
with such a large agricultural sector, China's problem was mainly one of development.  The primary task,
after liberalization, was to promote entry and shift labor from agriculture to industry.  In Eastern
Europe/former Soviet Union, on the other hand, the problem was one of structural adjustment in an urban
and "over-industrialized" economy.  Privatization was necessary to re-structure industry.  The initial
conditions of the two cases dictated the results: while development in China enhanced the welfare of
virtually all groups, re-structuring in Eastern Europe/former Soviet Union produced both winners and
losers. Dabrowski, Gomulka, and Rostowski (2000) find similar flaws in the McMillan/Naughton/Stiglitz
argument.  They also argue that a simple comparison of growth rates in China and the former Soviet47
Union is misleading.  China is an underdeveloped, industrializing nation with significant growth
potential, while the FSU mainly faces problems of reorganizing an existing industrial base.  Furthermore,
these authors claim that Chinese SOEs face much less effective - in fact, almost non-existent -- corporate
governance than that suggested by McMillan and Naughton.  Finally, they note that the Stiglitz/
McMillan/Naughton argument ignores the successful "speedy" transitions of Hungary, Poland, Slovenia,
and (to a lesser extent) the Baltics.  Citing EBRD data, the authors argue that in general, "early" reformers
and privatizers experience less income inequality and higher standards of living than do "late" reformers
and privatizers.
Moreover, McMillan and Naughton's  argument that SOEs can be reformed from within fails to test the
appropriate counter-factual.  Even if gradual reforms improved SOE performance relative to the status
quo, could privatization would have yielded still greater improvements?  These authors implicitly
discount this possibility by pointing to the failed privatizations in the former Soviet Union, but they
ignore successful privatizations in other developing and transition nations.
*  *  *  *
Extraneous objectives and underdeveloped markets and institutions can introduce distortions in the
privatization process that cause privatized firms to perform less well than a purely private firm.  However,
this does not necessarily mean that a privatized firm will under-perform a publicly owned firm.  Criticism
of privatization on the grounds that privatized firms do not perfectly mimic private firms (Stiglitz 1999a
and 1999b; Cook, Kirkpatrick 1997; Caves 1990; Kay, Thompson 1986) is misguided if privatized firms
still outperform SOEs.  The empirical evidence suggests that this is the case -- while privatized firms may
not be identical to private firms, they are usually superior to state-owned enterprises.
In categorizing the success or failure of privatizations, it is useful to make distinctions between
privatization in developing, industrialized, and transition economies; and also between the transition
experiences of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Nellis (1999) provides a good overview of48
such categorizations,  and the conclusions  that may be drawn  from them. As noted before,  privatization  in
developing  nations has generally  been seen as a success  (Megginson,  Nash, Randenborgh  1994;  Galal,
Jones, Tandon,  Vogelsang 1994;  Ramamurti  1997;  Boubakri,  Cosset 1998; La Porta and Lopez-de-
Silanes 1997). Privatizations  in Eastern  Europe  have  also generally  met with success  (Frydman  et al 1997
and 1998;  Pohl et al 1997;  Claessens,  Djankov,  Pohl 1997). However,  privatizations  in Russia  and the
other  nations  of the former  Soviet  Union  have  been marked  by failures  to restructure  and poor firm
performance (Djankov 1999;  Frydman,  Gray et al 1998;  Djankov  and Murrell  2000; EBRD 1999).
Nellis (1999),  synthesizing  the lessons  from the Russian  experience,  concludes  that too much  emphasis
was placed on speedy  privatization,  and not enough  emphasis  was  placed on fostering  competition,
creating  property  rights and court  systems  to enforce  them, avoiding  insider  privatization,  and the other
institutions  necessary  for well-functioning  markets  and corporate  governance. These  findings  are echoed
in Stiglitz  (1999a) and (1999b),  and Shleifer  (1997). Nevertheless,  Nellis points to the record  of
successful  privatizations  in Eastern  Europe  and maintains  that privatization  is a key part of transition.
6.  Empirical  Work
A review  of the evidence  from empirical  studies  sheds  additional  light on the relative performance  of
public  and private  enterprises. Empirical  study  of SOE  efficiency  began  in earnest after Alchain  (1965)
predicted  that publicly-owned  firms would  be inherently  less efficient  than private firms. Early work
compared  public and private  firms in the same industry,  and focused  on utilities and infrastructure  in
industrialized  nations. Subsequent  research  branched  into  more competitive  industries  and developing
nations. Some scholars  criticized  these  cross-sectional  comparisons,  arguing  that the differences  due to
ownership  could  never be isolated  from other  spurious  differences  (Millward,  1982, 1983). However,  the
wave of privatizations  in developed  nations  during  the 1980's,  particularly  in Britain, opened  a new
avenue  of empirical  investigation:  same-firm  performance  before  and after privatization  could  be49
compared.  Privatizations in developing nations and transition economies brought more opportunities for
such comparisons.
Table 1 shows a summary of this empirical literature. The main criteria for inclusion in this table were
frequency of citation, and inclusion in highly-cited review articles (Millward 1982; Millward and Parker
1983; Borcherding et. al. 1982; Boardman and Vining 1989; D'Souza and Megginson 1999a; and
Megginson and Netter 2000).  The sets of articles cited by these reviews (particularly the last three) have
considerable overlap.  It was essentially this common set of articles, with some additions from the earlier
literature on utilities, that was used to form Table 1. Secondary criteria for inclusion in this table were the
use of statistical tests and sample size.  Studies with extremely small sample sizes were dropped unless
they were highly cited;  studies that were based on anecdotal evidence only were always dropped.  It is
possible that some forthcoming or unpublished articles have been omitted.  The articles were categorized
into "private superior", "ambiguous", or "public superior" based on the balance of empirical evidence
presented in each study.  If a study found public superiority in some cases and private superiority in
others, it was categorized based on the relative numbers of observations or restrictiveness of conditions of
the two findings.  If public and private superiority are found in approximately equal numbers of
observations and in equally restrictive conditions, then the study is categorized as "ambiguous".
The included articles span the period from 1971 to the present, use a variety of performance measures,
and are balanced with respect to developing/industrialized nations. A variety of competitive
environments are considered, from statutory monopoly to perfect competition.50
Table  1
Study  Industry  Measure  of  Methodology  Sample  Size  Country  Market
Structure
Performance  0 = LDC  1 =no
competition
1 = pre/post  1 = transition 2-3 = inter-
privatization  mediate
0 = cross-  2 = indust-  4 = full
sectional  rialized  competition
comparison
Private  Hill 1982  Textiles  capital  + labor  prod  0  81  0  4
Ownership  Perkins  1983  Mfg.  capital  + labor  prod  0  300  0  3
Superior  Kitchen  1976  Garbage  cost  0  48  2  1
collection
Savas  1977*  Garbage  cost  0  315  2  Mixed
collection
Crain,  Zardkoohi  1978  Water  cost  0  ?  2  1
supply
Edwards,  Stevens  1978  Garbage  cost  0  77  2  3
collection
Funkhouser,  McAvoy  1979  Mfg.  cost, profits  0  99  0  4
Pryke  1992  Mixed  cost, profits  0  6  2  3
Majumdar  1998  Mixed  efficiency  0  industry-wide  0  mixed
Davies  1971  Airlines  labor  prod.  0  2  2  2
Ros  1999  Telecom  labor  prod.  0  17 countries  0, 2  mixed
Peltzman  1971  Electricity  price  0  128  2  1
Bennett,  Johnson  1979  Garbage  price  0  2  2  2
collection
Dewenter,  Malatesta  1999**  Mixed  profits  0  1369  2  mixed
Boardman,  Vining  1989  Mfg.  profits,  labor  prod  0  499  2  4
Boardman,  Vining  1992  Mixed  profits,  labor  prod  0  370  2  3, 4
Ehrlich,  Gallis-Hamonno,  Liu,  and Lutter  Airlines  TFP  0  23  0,  2  mixed
1994
Gupta  1982  Chemicals  TFP  0  ?  0  4
La Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes  1997  Mixed  cost,  profits,  labor  1  218  0  mixed
prod
Frydman,  Gray,  Hessel,  Rapaczynski  1997 Mfg.  cost,  labor  prod.  1  185  1  4
Ramamurti  1997  Railroad  labor  prod.  1  8  0  2
Megginson,  Nash,  Randenborgh  1994  Mixed  labor  prod.,  profts  1  61  0, 2  mixed
Pohl,  Anderson,  Claessens,  Djankov  1997 Mfg.  labor  prod.,  TFP  1  6300  1  4
Eckel,  Eckel,  Singal  1996  Airlines  price  1  1  2  4
Claessens,  Djankov,  Pohl 1997  Mixed  profits  1  706  1  4
Boubakri,  Cosset  1998  Mixed  profits  1  79  0  mixed
Dewenter,  Malatesta  1999**  Mixed  profits  1  63  0, 2  mixed
D'Souza,  Megginson  1999a**  Mixed  profits  1  85  0, 2  mixed
D'Souza,  Megginson  1999b**  Telecom  profits  I  17  0, 2  mixed
Frydman,  Hessel,  Rapacynski  1998  Mfg.  restructuring  1  130  1  4
Barberis,  Boycko,  Shleifer,  Tsukanova  Retail  restructuring  1  413  1  4
1996
Galal, Jones, Tandong, Vogelsang 1994  Mixed  TFP/welfare  1  12  0, 2  mixed51
Table 1 (cont'd)
Study  Industry  Measure  of  Methodology Sample  Country  Market
Size  Structure
Performance  0 = LDC  I =no
competition
1 = pre/post  1 = transition 2-3 = inter-
privatization  mediate
0 = cross-  2 = indust-  4 = full
sectional  nalized  competition
comparison
Ambiguous  Yunker  1975  Electricity  Cost  0  73  2  1
Or No  Kemper,  Quigley  1976  Garbage  Cost  0  90  2  3
collection
Difference  Atkinson,  Halvorsen  1986  Electricity  Cost  0  153  2  1
Forsyth,  Hocking  1980  Airlines  labor  prod.  0  2  2  2
Yarrow  1986  Mixed  Profits  0  5  2  4
Kole,  Mulherin  1997  Mixed  profits,  labor  prod  0  17  2  4
Tyler 1979  Mfg.  TFP  0  38  0  4
Caves,  Christensen  1980  Railroad  TFP  0  2  2  4
Foreman-Peck,  Manning  1988  Telecom  labor  prod.  1  1  2  2
Adam,  Cavendish  & Mistry  1992  Mixed  labor  prod.  1  6  0  mixed
countries
Frydman,  Gray,  Hessel,  Rapaczynski  1998 Mfg.  labor  prod.  1  218  1  4
Bishop,  Kay 1989  Mixed  Profits  1  12  2  mixed
Martin,  Parker  1995  Mixed  profits,  labor  prod  1  11  2  mixed
Boubakri,  Cosset  1998  Mixed  Profits  1  16  0  ?
Newbery, Pollitt 1997***  Electricity  TFPlwelfare  1  1  2  2
Public  Meyer  1975  Electricity  Cost  0  180  2  1
Ownership  Mann,  Mikesell  1976  Water  Cost  0  214  2  1
supply
Superior  Neuberg  1977  Electricity  Cost  0  ?  2  1
Fare,  Grosskopf,  Logan  1985  Electricity  allocative  + tech  0  153  2  1
efficiency
_Pescatrice,  Trapani 1980  Electricity  cost  0  56  2  1
* Savas 1977  finds  that competing  private  contractors  for garbage  collection  are superior  to public
ownership,  which in turn is superior  to an auctioned  monopoly. Some may argue  that this demonstrates
public superiority. In our judgement,  these results  support  private  ownership.
* * Dewenter  and Malatesta  1999  is a single  article. However,  the authors  conduct  two very distinct
studies, using different  samples  and methodology.  Thus we count  these as two studies. D'Souza and
Megginson  1999a  and 1999b  are two distinct published  articles.
***  Newbery  and Pollit find an overall increase  in welfare  due to privatization.  However,  they find that
producers  gain while  the government  and consumers  lose. Therefore,  we judged  there results  to be
"ambiguous"  with regard  to public  or private superiority.
Of the 52 studies included  in Table 1, 32 conclude  that the performance  of private and privatized  firms
are significantly  superior  to that of public  firms. 15 studies find either that there is no significant
relationship  between  ownership  and performance,  or that the relationship  is ambiguous  (different
evidence  supports  both public and private superiority). Five studies  conclude  that publicly-owned  firms
perform  better than private  firms.  The dominance  of studies  finding  superior  private performance  is
robust across  all sub-categories. Of the 31 studies  that compare  private and public firms operating  in the52
same industry, 18 conclude  that private firms have  higher  performance,  while 8 report mixed  results and
five find superior  public performance.  Among  the 21 studies  that examine  the performance  of a firm
before  and after privatization,  14  find that performance  improves,  while seven find no significant  change.
Private superiority  is also evident  in both industrialized  and developing  nations.  If we double  count the
seven studies that examine  both developing-country  and industrialized-country  privatization  by including
them in both categories,  then among  industrial  countries  we have 19 private-superior  studies, 11 neutral
studies,  and 5 public-superior  studies among  industrial  countries. Among  developing  nations  there are 15
private-superior  studies and 3 neutral  studies,  with no studies where  public enterprises  do better.
Private  firms do better in fully competitive  markets. In such markets,  there are 11  private-superior  studies
and five neutral  studies. This advantage  persists  but is less  pronounced  in monopolistic  markets,  where
six studies find private superiority,  five find neutral results,  and five find public superiority. No studies
find that public ownership  is superior  in potentially  competitive  industries.
This body of empirical  literature  indicates  that private or privatized  ownership  is superior  to public
ownership  in a variety of situations. The balance  of studies  show that firm performance  improves  after
privatization. Private firms perform  better in all market structures,  although  the relative  ambiguity  of this
result in monopolies  suggests  that private  ownership  and competition  are complements. Private
ownership  has an advantage  in both industrialized  and developing  nations,  and this lead is more
pronounced  in the latter. This result is especially  noteworthy,  given  the argument  by many SOE
proponents  that market failures  in developing  nations  make SOEs  more  viable relative to private firms.53
7.  Conclusion
Our review found greater ambiguity about ownership in theory than in the empirical literature.  In the
debate over the effects of competition, theory suggests that ownership may matter and if so, that private
firms will outperform SOEs.  The empirical studies squarely favor private ownership in competitive
markets.  Theory's  ambiguity about ownership in monopoly markets seems better justified,  since the
empirical literature is also less conclusive about the effects of ownership in such markets.  Theories that
assume a welfare maximizing government suggest that SOEs can correct market failures.  In contrast,
public choice theories are skeptical of the benevolent government model.  Corporate governance theories
suggest that even well intentioned governments may not be able to assure that SOE managers do their
bidding.  The empirical literature favors those skeptical of SOEs as a tool to address market failures. In
studies of industrialized countries, where we might expect more developed political markets to motivate
greater government concern with welfare maximization or better information and incentives to overcome
corporate governance problems, private firms still have an advantage. The private advantage is more
pronounced in developing countries, where market failures are more likely.
Theoretical critiques of privatization suggest that distorted objectives, market failures and poor
institutions will lead to costly failures.  Some of the theoretical studies voicing concern about inevitable
privatization failures suffer from the absence of a realistic SOE counterfactual or are extrapolating from a
few, prominent cases, such as Russia.  The 21 empirical studies we cite in Table 1 find that most firms do
better and all firms at least as well after privatization. None of the studies find that performance would be
better had they not been privatized.
The current debate over privatization is partly an understandable reaction to prominent and recent
failures.  To the extent that it prompts further re-examination of the privatization experience, it will be a
welcome development.  Additional empirical studies of privatization, especially of regulated monopolies,54
is needed  and could  benefit from the longer  experience  and larger  sample  sizes now available. Sorting
out the effects of regulation  versus  ownership  will be difficult  but well worth the challenge,  since many
governments  are only now considering  divestiture  of monopolies. The  political economy  of privatization
also merits  further examination.
The outcome of the privatization  debate  will be less healthy,  however,  to the extent that it feeds any
backlash  against  privatization  and private ownership  in general. The  dialogue between  theorists'and
empiricists  on this point is weak. Part of the problem  seems  to be the choice  of counterfactual.  Much of
the recent  theoretical  critiques of privatization  address  deviations  from optimal  firm behavior. Not
surprisingly,  since  an optimal  firm is hard to find, such  a framework  highlights  the flaws and
shortcomings  of privatized  firns.  Empirical  research  has taken  state ownership  as the counterfactual,  and
as we have seen, documented  gains in most cases. Construction  of the state-owned  counterfactual  is a
problem  since  the privatization  decision  suggest  that the utility  function  of the government  has changed.
A government  that puts higher  value on efficiency  or sound  fiscal policies  would operate  its SOEs
differently  as well. Those theories  that do treat state-owned  firms as a counterfactual  to privatization  do
not address  this issue or consider  how likely  it is that distorted  objectives  for privatization  signal  perverse
goals for SOEs. Empirical  research  consists  largely  of before-and-after  comparisons  that do not capture
any change in government  preferences,  nor controls  for changes  in markets. Galal  et al (1994)  do try to
construct  a counterfactual  that they adjust  for changes  in government's  objectives  and control  for other
changes,  but such adjustments  are necessarily  arbitrary  and the sample  is small.
Since  the choice confronting  governments  is between  state ownership  and privatization,  rather  than
between  privatization  and optimality,  theory  had left a gap that empirical  work has tried to fill. Further
research  is needed  to model  the institutional  circumstances  under  which privatization  will dominate  state
ownership  and vice versa.55
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